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NOTE
Health Courts: An Extreme Makeover of Medical
Malpractice with Potentially Fatal Complications
Emily Chow*
INTRODUCTION
United States citizens spent $5267 per capita on health care in 2002, nearly
$2000 more than any other country,' with annual spending reaching $1.6
trillion.2 Yet quality and availability of medical care continue to be concerns, and
medical malpractice litigation is frequently blamed for rising consumer costs and
skyrocketing physicians' malpractice premiums. 3 With physicians abandoning
medical specialties with high malpractice premiums like neurosurgery,4 and
obstetrics-gynecology residencies reaching only 65% capacity for the medical
school class of 2004, 5 there is a growing consensus within the medical
* J.D., University of Wisconsin, 2007; B.A., Johns Hopkins University, 2004. I must thank
my parents for their many years of support and sacrifice; my sister, Lilly, for her inspirational
brilliance and amusing palaver; and Jonathan Packer for his unending patience and constant
encouragement. I would also like to thank Alexander Park for introducing me to this topic, Katie
Mason and Nic Eichenseer for their insightful comments on earlier drafts, and the 2006-07 senior
board of the Wisconsin Law Review for indulging me during the production of this Note.
1. Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Spending in the United States and the Rest of the
Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFF. 903, 904 (2005).
2. Katharine Levit et al., Health Spending Rebound Continues in 2002, 23 HEALTH AFF. 147,
148 (2004).
3. Ceci Connolly, Malpractice Situation Not Dire, Study Finds, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005,
at A8 (reporting that President George W. Bush, the American Medical Association, and some
scholars believe lawsuits and large jury awards "have forced malpractice premiums to historically
high levels"); Mark Moran, Malpractice Liability Cap Fails in Senate, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Aug. 1,
2003, at 1.
4. Joe Fahy, Neurosurgeons Flee High Insurance Costs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar.
26, 2006, at A13.
5. Press Release, Nat'l Resident Matching Program, Record Number of Applicants Matched
to Residency Programs (Mar. 18, 2004), http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/pressrel/2004/040318
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community that current efforts to resolve the "medical malpractice crisis" are
failing.6 The debate has spawned a variety of actions, including implementing
noneconomic damage caps, 7 physician walkouts, 8 and the firing of a hospital
staff member whose spouse's law firm had a malpractice group. 9 A surgeon from
South Carolina has even attempted to obtain the American Medical Association's
(AMA) support for his grassroots approach of refusing treatment to malpractice
lawyers, their families, and their employees: "[it is] analogous to hitting the
lawyers with a 2-by-4. Now we have their attention. Now maybe we can make
some progress."' 0
In fact, there has not been much progress in medical malpractice reform,
especially as compared to the technological advancements in medicine over the
last thirty years. "1 Malpractice became "medicine's most serious crisis" for the
first time in 1975, when many commercial insurers struggled to provide adequate
coverage for physicians. 12 Despite the cyclical onset of several of these crises,
13
the traditional tort system remains the primary tool for victims of malpractice
seeking compensation. 14
The AMA has designated seventeen states as being in a full-blown medical
.htm (noting that, despite a 5.3% increase in participation from 2003 levels, only 65.1% of the
obstetrics-gynecology residency positions were filled). Since then, the interest in obstetrics-
gynecology has increased: "[Ninety-eight] percent of these positions were filled [in 2006], 72
percent by U.S. medical school seniors." Press Release, Nat'l Resident Matching Program, More
U.S. Medical School Seniors Choose Residencies in Competitive and "Lifestyle" Specialties (Mar.
16, 2006), http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/pressrelU2006/060316.htm.
6. See Michelle M. Mello et al., The New Medical Malpractice Crisis, 348 NEw ENG. J. MED.
2281, 2284 (2003) ("[M]ost expect the malpractice crisis to deepen and spread even in the face of
aggressive tort-reform efforts at the state and federal levels."); Common Good, An Urgent Call for
Special Health Courts: America Needs a Reliable System of Medical Justice (2005),
http://cgood.org/assets/attachments/130.pdf
7. See, e.g., Press Release, Wis. Office of the Governor, Governor Doyle Signs Assembly Bill
1073 (Mar. 22, 2006), http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/joumalmedia-detail.asp?locid=19&prid=
1842 (reporting the implementation of a new higher noneconomic-damage cap in Wisconsin).
8. AMA Chief Professor Square Off on Blame for Malpractice Crisis, 33 MOD. HEALTHCARE
52 (2003) (reporting the reactions of AMA president-elect Donald Palmisano and Professor
Jonathan Turley to a physician walkout in West Virginia). Turley accused the doctors of "medical
terrorism." Id. According to Turley, "These latest walkouts are nothing short of hostagetaking:
demanding huge benefits in exchange for basic medical care for captive patients." Id.
9. Laura Parker, Medical-Malpractice Battle Gets Personal, USA TODAY, June 14, 2004, at
IA.
10. Id.
11. William M. Sage, Medical Malpractice Insurance and the Emperor's Clothes, 54 DEPAUL
L. REv. 463, 463 (2005).
12. Id. at 469.
13. Id. at 469-70.
14. See James C. Mohr, American Medical Malpractice Litigation in Historical Perspective,
283 JAMA 1731, 1736 (2000) ("[N]otwithstanding some movement in recent decades toward
special judicial panels ... the nation's commitment to the ultimate mechanism of the ordinary jury
is... likely to remain unshakably in place.").
VIl:2 (2007)
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liability crisis because "the nation's out-of-control legal system is forcing
physicians ... to retire early, relocate or give up performing high-risk medical
procedures," effectively preventing patient access to medical care. 5 Numerous
studies link physicians' fear of litigation and higher insurance premiums to their
practice of "defensive medicine ' 6 and the avoidance of high-risk specialties to
qualify for less expensive liability insurance. 17 Some commentators worry that
the rising malpractice costs will force physicians to stop practicing altogether,
jeopardizing the availability of health care in some areas of the country.
18
Despite endorsement from the AMA, over fifty other physician, insurance, and
patient organizations, as well as President George W. Bush, legislation proposing
to limit malpractice liability has consistently failed to pass through Congress. 19
In an early 2005 speech advocating for the cap, President Bush stated that
[w]hat's happening all across this country is that lawyers are filing baseless
suits against hospitals and doctors .... So doctors end up paying tens of
thousands, or even hundreds of thousands, of dollars to settle claims, out of
court, even when they know they have done nothing wrong. When insurance
premiums rise, doctors have no choice but to pass some of the costs on to their
patients .... If you're a patient, it means you're paying a higher cost to go see
your doctor.
20
Meanwhile, researchers studying the alleged medical malpractice crisis in the
15. Am. Med. Ass'n, AMA (Policy) Medical Liability Crisis Map, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/noindex/category/ 11871 .html (last visited May 3, 2007).
16. "Defensive medicine is a deviation from sound medical practice that is induced primarily
by a threat of liability .... [by] supplement[ing] care . . . , replac[ing] care ..., or reduc[ing]
care ..." David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in
a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2609 (2005). Although the prevalence of
defensive medicine is difficult to quantify, id, Common Good claims that doctors order "billions of
dollars of unnecessary tests and procedures each year" in order to protect themselves from
malpractice liability. Common Good, supra note 6, at 2.
17. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Defensive Medicine and Disappearing
Doctors?, REG., Fall 2005, at 24, 30; Studdert et al., supra note 16, at 2616.
18. See Common Good, supra note 6, at 8 ("Unreliable justice is driving good ob-gyns out of
practice, scaring medical students away from obstetrics and gynecology, and leaving women across
the nation without prenatal and delivery care." (quoting Vivian M. Dickerson, President, Am. Coll.
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists)); Charles Hurt, Edwards' Malpractice Suits Leave Bitter Taste,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at Al ("As a result of [malpractice] cases, insurance rates have
skyrocketed-putting some out of business and driving others away, especially from rural areas.").
But see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (2004);
Baicker & Chandra, supra note 17, at 29 (concluding that "there is little evidence of a mass exodus
of physicians in response to increases in malpractice liability" upon analysis of empirical data). The
General Accounting Office substantiated reduced access to emergency surgery and newborn
delivery "in scattered, often rural, areas where providers identified other long-standing factors that
affect the availability of services," but it determined that high malpractice premiums "did not
widely affect access to health care." CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra, at 7.
19. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 3, at 1.
20. Connolly, supra note 3.
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President's home state of Texas, one of the AMA's crisis states, found a sea of
calm and reported that "at least in Texas, the tort system can't be the cause of
spikes in malpractice premiums. 21
Despite Bush's characterization of the malpractice crisis, the upward trend
of litigation and damage awards does not directly correlate to the steady rise in
malpractice premiums.22 In July 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found a
ten-year-old noneconomic damage cap of $350,000 to be unconstitutional,
"unreasonable and arbitrary because it [was] not rationally related to the
legislative objective of lowering medical malpractice insurance premiums., 23 In
overturning the cap, the court cited various Wisconsin Office of the
Commissioner of Insurance Reports on the statute, which "indicate[d] that a
number of factors affect malpractice premium insurance rates, and that. . . 'no
direct correlation [could] be drawn between the caps enacted in 1995 and current
rate changes taking place in the primary market today.' 24 Amidst the ongoing
controversy over the effectiveness-and even constitutionality-of inconsistent
reforms among different states, some advocates are now seeking a long-term
solution through structural alteration of the traditional medical malpractice
system in the form of health courts to hear malpractice cases.25
Like other courts in areas such as tax and bankruptcy, health courts would
take the decision-making process away from juries and instead leave
determinations up to a panel of expert judges.26 According to Philip K. Howard,
Chair of Common Good-a nonpartisan tort reform organization seeking to
implement health courts-"the goal is to have deliberate rulings ... so that
doctors know where they stand because standards of care will be judged by
people with expertise in the medical field.",2 7 To regulate the distribution of
compensation under the health court model, Common Good has proposed the use
of a rate schedule to normalize the amount of damages awarded for various
21. Id. (quoting one of the study's co-authors, Professor David A Hyman). After analyzing
about fifteen years worth of medical malpractice claims from Texas, researchers determined that
"[n]o sudden rise in claim frequency, payments, defense costs, or jury verdicts preceded or
accompanied the premium spike that occurred in Texas after 1998." Bernard Black et al., Stability,
Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 207, 255 (2005). See Am. Med. Ass'n, supra note 15 (citing Texas as a "great example" of a
state enacting significant reforms and improving its "liability climate").
22. Sage, supra note 11, at 470.
23. Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 468 (Wis. 2005).
Following Ferdon, Wisconsin passed a new noneconomic damage cap of $750,000. Wis. Office of
the Governor, supra note 7.
24. Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 470-71 (quoting the Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of
Insurance report on the impact of the 1995 cap).
25. Michael Romano, Trial and Error: Medical Courts, Arbitration Systems Are Among the
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injuries and a 20% cap on trial-lawyer contingency fees to ensure that the victim
is the one who is actually compensated.28 Without the expenses of educating a
lay jury and the threat of multimillion-dollar damages, the health court model
would in theory lower the cost of litigating a malpractice claim, and its
proponents assume that lower litigation costs translate to lower liability insurance
premiums and health care costs.
29
Proponents also believe that health courts would be more equitable for
injured patients by preventing trial lawyer screening for "jackpot justice" (that is,
the practice of only accepting sympathetic cases with the promise of large
payouts).3 ° Without this financially driven filter, so the argument goes, more
victims with less severe injuries could gain access to the courtroom. Health
courts could also benefit physicians by taming the soaring cost of malpractice
insurance often attributed to the unpredictable application of medical standards
by overly compassionate juries.3'
There are, however, many unanswered concerns associated with such an
extreme makeover of the traditional tort scheme. Critics claim that health courts
would deprive injured victims of the right to be heard by fellow citizens
considered so sacrosanct by the founding fathers.32 Employing these specialized
tribunals to discipline negligent doctors undercuts the notion of community
standards by charging a select group of similarly trained individuals with the task
of compensating malpractice victims. 33 Moreover, there exists a high risk of
politicization of the health court's bench, given the financial stakes that insurance
companies, defendant physicians, trial lawyers, and plaintiff victims all have in
medical malpractice litigation. 34 Most significantly, while the use of health courts
may lower the transactional costs of each individual claim, the net effect of
lowering the transactional costs is the invitation of more claims that victims
would otherwise not file under the high transactional costs of the current system.
It is unclear how a limited number of health courts would be able to handle this
increased burden and how the malpractice insurers would respond.
28. Common Good, supra note 6.
29. Id. ("Fear of lawsuits makes it almost impossible even to talk about containing costs.").
30. Philip K. Howard, Chair, Common Good, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American
Medical Association's House of Delegates (June 17, 2003), available at http://cgood.org/
healthcare-reading-cgpubs-speeches-8.html.
31. Romano, supra note 25, at 26.
32. Id.
33. Kristin Eliasberg, Malpractice Fix: Everyone Wants To Untangle the Medical Malpractice
Mess-But Balancing Justice and Medicine May Be a Risky Procedure, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 21,
2005, at El ("[Relying on a jury in medical malpractice cases] seems better than relying on an elite
group who all have similar training and biases that go along with that training-whether in law
school or medical school.") (quoting Professor Nancy Marder, Chicago-Kent College of Law).
34. Catherine T. Struve, Improving the Medical Malpractice Litigation Process, 23 HEALTH
AFF. 33, 37 (2004) (comparing the issue of politicization in health courts to the diffusion of
political pressures in the conventional tort system due to a large number of judges hearing a variety
of cases).
5
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Despite protests from trial lawyers across the country,35 the idea of health
courts surfaced in Washington in the form of pending legislation, the Fair and
Reliable Medical Justice Act of 2005.36 Introduced for the second time by
Senator Michael Enzi of Wyoming on June 29, 2005 (and cosponsored by
Senator Max Baucus of Montana), the Act provides up to ten federal grants to
interested states for "the development, implementation, and evaluation of
alternatives to current tort litigation" in medical malpractice. 37 Each state
pursuing a federal grant under the Act would be required to demonstrate how its
alternative "(A) makes the medical liability system more reliable through prompt
and fair resolution of disputes; (B) encourages the early disclosure of health care
errors; (C) enhances patient safety; and (D) maintains access to liability
insurance. 38 The Act expressly suggests a "special health care court model," as
one of three enumerated possible alternatives. 39 The courts would give "judges
with health care expertise" the authority "to make binding rulings on causation,
compensation, standards of care, and related issues with reliance on independent
expert witnesses commissioned by the court.",40 The Act's funding of these pilot
programs is limited by "such sums as may be necessary .... [These funds] shall
remain available until expended.,
41
The bill has already garnered support across party lines and from both the
medical and legal communities. 41 On June 22, 2006, the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions held hearings on medical-liability
proposals, including the Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act.43 Congressional
Quarterly HealthBeat reported that health courts "attracted much attention...
[with witnesses] divided on their merits." 4 Howard was the third witness to
testify at the committee hearing:
A court that writes opinions based on accepted medical standards not only
holds the promise of overcoming the debilitating distrust [towards the current
tort system], but can provide affirmative guidelines for improving care .... By
35. See Eliasberg, supra note 33; Romano, supra note 25, at 26-27.
36. Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1337, 109th Cong. (2005).
37. Id. § 3(a)-(b).
38. Id. § 3(c)(2).
39. Id. § 3(d)(2)-(4).
40. Id. The bill itself does not define "health care expertise"; it only requires that health court
judges "meet applicable State standards for judges and... agree to preside over such court
voluntarily." Id.
41. Id. § 3(k).
42. See Press Release, Common Good, Bipartisan Legislation to Create Special Health Courts
Is Introduced in U.S. Senate (June 30, 2005), http://cgood.org/healthcare-newscommentary-
inthenews-24 1 .html.
43. See U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, Hearings and Executive
Sessions, http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2006 06_22/2006_06_22.html (last visited May 3, 2007).
44. Enzi Casts Wider Net for Solutions to Malpractice Compensation Woes, CQ HEALTHBEAT,
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restoring reliability to healthcare disputes, special health courts hold the
promise of bringing order and good sense to the vital decisions needed for
effective, safe and affordable healthcare in America.
45
Despite the superficial appeal of health courts, however, these specialized
tribunals may have detrimental effects on the cost of providing and obtaining
health care, the efficiency of trials, and the equity of judgments. This Note
compares the concept of health courts with the traditional tort regime to
determine whether health courts could actually serve as a superior alternative in
alleviating the malpractice crisis.4 6
Part I of this Note presents an overview of the Fair and Reliable Medical
Justice Act of 2005 and the health court model as it has been marketed to the
medical community. Part II compares the proposed model to the current
malpractice litigation system in terms of equity of judgments, per trial and net
transactional costs, efficiency of dispute resolution and victim compensation,
liability insurance premiums, and health care costs. Part III examines the
potential effects of employing health courts through case studies of nontraditional
tort programs, including California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
arbitration provision, Wisconsin's medical mediation panels, and New Jersey's
special mass tort courts.
This Note concludes that the risks associated with the implementation of
health courts outweigh the few benefits they may provide over the traditional tort
system. While health courts may increase courtroom access to more victims of
medical malpractice and establish a uniform standard of care for physicians, they
would also likely impose an immense net transactional cost, delay victim
compensation, and drive up malpractice premiums without ensuring more
equitable results or lowering the cost of health care. Employing a health court
system would thus only aggravate the nation's health care problems. And in light
of the curative effect of some existing reforms,4 7 replacing the tort system with a
specialized administrative court with uncertain consequences appears
45. Medical Liability: New Ideals for Making the System Work Better for Patients: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 109th Cong. 11-12 (2006)
(statement of Philip K. Howard, Chair of Common Good), available at http://help.senate.gov/
Hearings/2006 06_22/howard.pdf.
46. This Note uses the term "malpractice crisis" to describe the subset of problems associated
with the availability and affordability of liability insurance. See Mello et al., supra note 6, 2281-82.
47. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 5. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONG., IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COSTS 65 (1993) (summarizing the
findings of six studies on total damage and noneconomic damage caps and concluding that damage
caps generally reduced the size of malpractice claims and premiums); Kenneth E. Thorpe, The
Medical Malpractice 'Crisis': Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFF.,
W4-20, W4-26-27 (Jan. 21 2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.20vl.pdf
(finding, in a comparison between states, that damage caps reduce malpractice premiums by 17.1%
on average). See also infra text accompanying notes 312-26 (discussing potential methods of
reforming the current system).
7
Chow: Health Courts: An Extreme Makeover of Medical Malpractice with Po
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
unwarranted and unnecessary.
I. OVERVIEW OF HEALTH COURTS AS A RESPONSE TO THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CRISIS
The Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act of 2005 embodies the frustration
of physicians and health care consumers with the current state of medical
malpractice and the intent of legislatures to respond with nontraditional
alternatives.48 Although the Act's section endorsing state experimentation with
special health courts leaves much to the imagination, the legal reform
organization, Common Good, has been lobbying for its own health court
model, 49 which fits comfortably within the Act's loose framework. 50 The
proposal materialized as a reaction to the medical malpractice crisis in the United
States, and its proponents believe that it is a desirable alternative to the current
litigation scheme. 51
A. The Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act of 200552
In 1932, Justice Louis Brandeis stated in a dissenting opinion that "[i]t is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country. 53 With pending legislation
and the potential availability of federal grant money, states may soon be able to
act as laboratories for an alternative to the current medical malpractice tort
regime. Building upon a 2002 Institute of Medicine report advocating the use of
state experiments in medical liability reform, 54 the Fair and Reliable Medical
Justice Act of 2005 proposes to fund state experiments in tort reform to find a
long-term solution to the medical malpractice crisis.55
In introducing the Act to Congress, Senator Enzi cited the 1991 Harvard
Medical Practice Study, which found that less than 2% of those injured by
48. See 151 CONG. REc. S7636-37 (daily ed. June 29, 2005) (statement of Sen. Enzi)
Clearly, the American people and their elected representatives have identified the need
to reform our current medical litigation system.... [W]e ought to lend a hand to States
that are working to change their current medical litigation systems and to develop
creative alternatives that could work much better for patients and providers.
49. Common Good, supra note 6; see also Michelle M. Mello et al., "Health Courts" and
Accountability for Patient Safety, 84 MILBANK Q. 459, 460-61 (2006).
50. See S. 1337, 109th Cong. § 3(d)(4) (2005).
51. See Common Good, supra note 6, at 4.
52. S. 1337.
53. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
54. Press Release, Max Baucus, Baucus Bill Seeks to Streamline Medical Malpractice Claims
(June 29, 2005), http://baucus.senate.gov/newsroom/details.cfmn?id=252923.
55. See S. 1337.
VII:2 (2007)
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medical negligence actually brought a case to court, meaning that most cases of
actual medical negligence were not litigated at all:
We like to say that justice is blind. With respect to our medical litigation
system, I would say that justice is absent and nowhere to be found .... No one
questions the need to restore reliability to our medical justice system. But how
do we begin the process? One way is to foster innovation by encouraging States
to develop more rational and predictable methods for resolving healthcare
injury claims. And that is what the Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act aims
to do. After all, the unfairness and unreliability of the current tort system seem
to be supported by the fact that over ninety-eight percent of malpractice victims
do not have their day in court.
56
Although the Act would help finance any state program that "demonstrate[s] how
the proposed alternative .. makes the medical liability system more reliable
through prompt and fair resolution of disputes; encourages the early disclosure of
health care errors; enhances patient safety; and maintains access to liability
insurance," it explicitly approves the three models described in its text,
57
including the "early disclosure and compensation model, 58 the "administrative
determination of compensation model," 59 and the "special health care court
model.",
60
56. 151 CONG. REc. S7635 (daily ed. June 29, 2005) (statement of Sen. Enzi); see also
A.Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to
Negligence. Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study 111, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245, 247,
250 (1991) (concluding through the use of empirical data that "the civil-justice system only
infrequency compensates injured patients and rarely identifies and holds health care providers
accountable for substandard medical care"). The Harvard Medical Practice Study "identified
patients who had filed claims against physicians and hospitals" in New York State in 1984 and
compared those results to "the incidence of injuries to patients caused by medical management." Id.
at 245.
57. S. 1337, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
58. Id. § 3(d)(2). The Act's "early disclosure and compensation model" requires health care
providers to disclose incidents of medical negligence resulting in severe injury to the patient and
provides those providers with the opportunity to offer good faith compensation of economic
damages, noneconomic damages, and reasonable attorney fees for a limited time without subjecting
them to tort liability. Id. § 3(d)(2)(A)-(D). This model expressly preserves "the right of an injured
patient to seek redress through the State tort system if a health care provider does not enter into a
compensation agreement with the patient." Id. § 3(d)(2)(E).
59. Id. § 3(d)(3). The Act's "administrative determination of compensation model" calls for a
board to establish classes of avoidable injuries and for the state to modify tort liability to bar
negligence claims in court against health care providers for those classes of avoidable injuries
except in cases of fraud or criminal conduct. Id. § 3(d)(3)(A)(i). The board would resolve liability
claims for the classes of avoidable injuries and determine compensation through the use of a
schedule, which would consider economic damages, noneconomic damages, and reasonable
attorney fees. Id. § 3(d)(3)(A)(ii). The model permits states to choose between three types of
appellate review: de novo review, review with deference, or opportunity for the victim to reject the
board's determinations and seek civil action. Id. § 3(d)(3)(B).
60. Id. § 3(d)(4).
395
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Far less developed than the other two suggested options, the Act's "special
health care court model" only consists of five brief paragraphs. 61 The brevity is
perhaps intentional, insofar as it permits various experimental spin-offs. The
section requires interested states to "ensure that such court is presided over by
judges with health care expertise who meet applicable State standards for judges
and who agree to preside over such court voluntarily." 62 States must also allow
the judges to make binding decisions on "causation, compensation, standards of
care, and related issues with reliance on independent expert witnesses
commissioned by the court., 63 The Act also instructs interested states to provide
for an appeals process, but it does not offer any further guidance in ensuring
adequate appellate review. 64 Additionally, the bill suggests optional use of an
"administrative entity" comprised of state-licensing boards, patient-advocacy
groups, health care providers, and trial attorneys-all of whom would act to
oversee the special court. 65
The Act's flexible structure would easily permit Common Good's health
court model. In fact, Senator Enzi ostensibly borrowed the organization's stated
mission of providing a more reliable system of medical justice for all Americans
when he introduced the bill to Congress in 2005. Aimed at combating the
"random justice" of inconsistent jury verdicts in medical malpractice cases and
the high costs of health care in America, Common Good's health court concept
boasts support from nearly ninety medical school deans and professors,
university presidents, and politicians.66 Even the Economist has agreed that
Common Good's health court proposal appears to be a "sensible idea" to fight
defensive medicine, restore access to health care for Americans, and compensate
actual victims of medical negligence. 67 By selectively combining several reforms
into one model, Common Good has created a superficially appealing solution to
the problems associated with the current tort system-however, it is a solution
that offers only limited improvements with significant setbacks.
B. Proposed Logistics of the Common Good's Health Court Model
Phillip Howard has said that "[m]edical courts are a better system, there's no
question about it."'68 The most developed and well-known plan for health courts
61. See id
62. Id. § 3(d)(4)(B).
63. Id. § 3(d)(4)(C).
64. Id. § 3(d)(4)(D). Common Good's proposal states that "[t]o assure uniformity and
predictability, each ruling could be appealed to a new Medical Appellate Court." Common Good,
supra note 6, at 4.
65. S. 1337, 109th Cong. § 3(d)(4)(E) (2005).
66. See Common Good, supra note 6.
67. Scalpel, Scissors, Lawyer: Litigation and Health Care, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2005, at 51
[hereinafter Scalpel, Scissors, Lawyer].
68. Romano, supra note 25, at 26.
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is Common Good's model, which replaces juries with a tribunal of judges with
medical expertise gained through education or experience to establish a uniform
standard of care. 69 The proposal circumvents the "dueling experts" phenomenon
by soliciting testimony from a neutral expert selected by the health court judges.
It also attempts to cut the cost of trial by imposing a 20% cap on attorney
contingency fees. 70 The model includes a predetermined injury-specific rate
schedule to normalize the distribution of noneconomic damages for any given
injury from verdict to verdict.7 1 While these four logistical elements may
accomplish their express goals, their implementation would also threaten to
aggravate the current malpractice crisis.
72
1. Expert Judges Instead of Juries
Howard has stated that one of the principal problems with the current tort
system is that juries make particularized decisions about the standard of care,
leading to inconsistent application from jury to jury. 73 Compounding the problem
is that juries can award damages reaching tens of millions of dollars based on
shaky merits. 74 In order to develop a uniform standard of care for physicians, the
health court model abolishes the use of juries in medical malpractice cases and
instead calls for review by full time judges who are "dedicated solely to
addressing healthcare cases ... [and] appointed through a nonpartisan screening
commission. 75 These judges would have relevant background or gain expertise
through handling medical malpractice cases exclusively. 76 Proponents argue that
these judges would become more expert in the overlap of the medical and legal
arenas and could establish precedents to guide doctors and patients on the proper
standard of care.77 Written rulings setting forth standard of care precedents would
promote consistency across fact patterns. 78 To maintain the uniformity of
69. Id.
70. Common Good, supra note 6; Mello et al., supra note 49, at 463 fig. .
71. Common Good, supra note 6.
72. See infra Part II.
73. Philip K. Howard, Op-Ed., Strong Medicine, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2007, at A6 ("[T]he civil
jury was never supposed to decide standards of care as a matter of law .... ). See also Eliasberg,
supra note 33.
74. See, e.g., Alastair MacLennan et al., Who Will Deliver Our Grandchildren? Implications of
Cerebral Palsy Litigation, 294 JAMA 1688, 1689 (2005); Stephanie Reitz, Hospital, Doctor
Faulted: Boy Suffered Brain Damage During Birth, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 29, 2005, at A 1.
75. Common Good, supra note 6.
76. See Romano, supra note 25, at 26 ("Health court judges would be nominated by a board of
qualifications, whose members would be appointed by the state.... The composition and
appointment procedures for the board of qualifications are matters for state policymakers to decide
but should be designed to ensure fairness and a balanced representation of stakeholders'
interests."); Mello et al., supra note 49, at 464.
77. Mello et al., supra note 49, at 464.
78. Common Good, supra note 6.
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judgments, any appeals would be reviewed by a new medical appellate court.79
This carving out of medical malpractice for adjudication by a specialized
tribunal draws its legitimacy from the success of specialized administrative
courts in other legal areas, like bankruptcy 80 and tax. 81 Certainly, the complexity
of medical standards, procedures, and terminology is not unlike the complexity
encountered in bankruptcy and tax proceedings, but the notion of removing the
decision-making process from a jury has constitutional and equitable
implications if done federally. 82 Currently pending health court legislation avoids
involving the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury guaranteed in federal
courts by seeking implementation on a state level. 83 With the limited number of
health court judges, however, even state health courts do not escape the
inevitable politicization of the health court bench.84 In such a highly polarized
environment, the selection of judges-even if by "a nonpartisan screening
commission' ' 85 or a "board of qualifications" 86-- could taint the fairness of trials.
The judges would be the sole determiners of liability and hand-pick "neutral"
experts from a predetermined pool selected by the same commission or board
that appoints the judges. 
87
2. "Neutral" Experts
Called upon to educate the jury and the legal community on the appropriate
79. Id.
80. Although Article I of the Constitution expressly gives Congress the authority to create
uniform laws on bankruptcy, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, the bankruptcy jurisdiction of federal
courts is a relatively recent development. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
92 Stat. 2549 (1978), amended by Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1071 (1984). The
Bankruptcy Reform Act granted original bankruptcy jurisdiction to the district courts and instituted
a bankruptcy court in every judicial district. Id.
81. Created by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 under Article I of the Constitution, U.S. Tax
Courts only hear federal tax cases and issue regular and memorandum decisions. See Tax Reform
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 730.
82. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1968) ("We are aware of the long debate,
especially in this century, [as] to the wisdom of permitting untrained laymen to determine the facts
in civil and criminal proceedings. [Most] of the controversy has centered on the jury in civil
cases.").
83. "Our recent work, conducted in partnership with... Common Good... , has led to a
number of refinements of the proposal: most notably, the proposition that reform should begin with
small-scale policy experiments." Mello et al., supra note 49, at 460. See also Romano, supra note
25, at 26.
84. See infra Subsection II.B.2.
85. Common Good, supra note 6.
86. Mello et al., supra note 49, at 465.
87. Id. The board would make its selection "after soliciting applications from the medical
community." Id. To qualify as an expert in a given case, the witness "would have to be qualified in
the same profession as the defendant ... and in a clinical specialty relevant to the nature of the
claim and to certify that he or she had no conflict of interest with respect to the case." Id.
VII:2 (2007)
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application of the standard of care in various situations, medical experts serve to
clarify and reinforce the standard by testifying about matters in their sphere of
medical expertise, exposing noncompliant physicians and protecting patients
from harmful practitioners.88 As such, expert testimony is the foundation of any
medical malpractice case. Traditionally, each party has relied on their own
medical expert to support its legal arguments, thus creating the perception that
"dueling 'hired gun' experts ... confuse and prolong disputes ..... 89 Although
expert testimony is often necessary to explain the intricacies of medical
procedures and treatment to juries, the phenomenon of dueling experts tends to
undermine efficiency and accountability by lengthening trials and encouraging
the jury to believe that medical knowledge and practice support both parties.
90
The AMA's Code of Medical Ethics requires that testifying medical experts
"have recent and substantive experience in the area in which they testify and
should limit testimony to their sphere of medical expertise ... [without]
becom[ing] an advocate or a partisan in the legal proceeding." 91 Medical experts,
however, are well compensated for their testimony, 92 and testifying for the
winning party increases an expert's marketability as a witness. While bad-faith
testimony from medical experts may be rare, 93 an expert's financial interest in
88. See AM. MED. Ass'N, E-9.07 MEDICAL TESTIMONY, in AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8539.html.
89. Common Good, supra note 6, at 6. See also J.H. Beuscher, The Use of Experts by the
Courts, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1105-06, (1941) (arguing that the use of "partisan experts...
frequently operates to confuse the... jury rather than to inform"); Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as
Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L.
REv. 1109, 1129-30 (1997) ("Interviews of jurors in... medical malpractice litigation... found
jurors skeptical of the economic, medical, and actuarial experts who had testified.").
90. See Sundby, supra note 89.
91. AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 88. The AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs relies
on findings of unethical conduct made by state medical societies and national specialty societies "to
acquit, admonish, censure, or place on probation the accused physician or suspend or expel him or
her from AMA membership .... However, the AMA is not in a position to take action against a
physician's license to practice medicine." Am. Med. Ass'n, Frequently Asked Questions in Ethics,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/5105.html#what can ama do (last visited May 3,
2007). State medical societies and licensing boards can begin professional reviews of physicians
who violate the AMA's Code of Medical Ethics. Am. Med. Ass'n, AMA (Ethics) Reporting Ethical
Violations, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2509.html (last visited May 3, 2007). State
licensing boards can initiate legal action on the physician's fitness to practice medicine. Id.
92. Kirby v. Ahmad, 635 N.E.2d 98, 99 (Ohio Com. P1. 1994) (noting that "the Hippocratic
Oath has been supplanted by opportunism and greed by those who participate as medical expert
witnesses" and charge 500 to 750 dollars per hour); GERRY SPENCE, WITH JUSTICE FOR NONE 270
(1989) ("Some medical school professors.., make several times their annual salary by selling
testimony to anyone who will retain them."); Douglas R. Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts and
Compensation, 67 TENN. L. REv. 909, 934 (2000) ("Treating physicians may charge expert witness
fees much higher than regular patient rates, a practice criticized by reviewing courts.").
93. Alexis Wood, Professional Oversight of Expert Testimony: Austin v. American
Association of Neurological Surgeons, AM. MED. ASS'N J. ETHICS, Apr. 2005, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/14859.html ("While compensation will not buy bad
13
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the outcome of the case can conflict with the obligation to advocate for the well-
being of patients. 94 Ultimately, the cost in terms of time, money, and reliability
associated with the use of dueling experts appears to undercut the accountability
of the justice system in medical malpractice cases. Health courts resolve this
issue by authorizing judges to select "neutral experts" in the relevant area of
medicine, rather than listen to dueling experts hired by the two parties. 95 Still, in
certain controversial areas of medicine, "neutral" experts may not exist, and the
current adversarial nature of expert witness testimony may be desirable. 96 It is
unclear how the health court judges would then decide which expert's opinion to
adopt as the standard of care. Despite these uncertainties, by abolishing the use of
dueling experts, Common Good claims that health courts would be able to
resolve most cases "within months" and "reduc[e] current costs by almost
half."9
97
3. A 20% Cap on Attorney Fees
Common Good's proposal also seeks to maximize victim compensation by
limiting attorney's fees to 20%.98 Malpractice attorneys typically operate on
contingent fees, such that they are only paid upon settlement or victory in court.
9 9
These fees usually constitute one-third of any award, but malpractice
contingency fees "are higher because [malpractice cases] are much riskier and
require the investment of substantial[ly] more money and time than the average
personal injury case. ' 1°° Because most malpractice attorneys operate on a
contingent-fee basis (charging at least forty percent), 10 1 they maintain financial
incentives to screen malpractice cases before providing representation, so as to
turn the highest possible yield: "Pursuing litigation is costly for lawyers. They
won't lay out a bet unless they think they'll win."' 0 2 Thus, cases with expected
damages of less than $200,000 are frequently turned down, leaving victims with
less severe injuries uncompensated. 1
03
faith testimony from most physicians, having a financial interest in the outcome of the case can
conflict with a physician's obligation to put the well-being of patients foremost at all times.").
94. AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 88.
95. Romano, supra note 25, at 26.
96. See, e.g., infra Subsection II.B.1 (describing the lack of consensus within the medical
community regarding the merits of electronic fetal monitoring in cerebral-palsy malpractice cases
against obstetrician-gynecologists).
97. Common Good, supra note 6.
98. Id.
99. Alexander Tabarrok, Give the Lawyer His Cut, FORBES, Oct. 3, 2005, at 42.
100. The Cochran Firm, The Attorney's Fee Contingency Fee,
http://www.cochranfirm.com/resourcedetail.asp?id=4&resource=17&detail=70 (last visited May
3, 2007).
101. Romano, supra note 25, at 27.
102. Tabarrok, supra note 99.
103. Romano, supra note 25, at 26.
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Common Good's proposal attempts to encourage the litigation of claims
seeking lesser damages, by effectively lowering the litigation bar of $200,000
through the lower cost per trial, and to put an extra 20% of damage awards in the
victim's pocket, by capping contingent fees in malpractice cases at 20%. 104 This
fee restriction would lead attorneys to modify client payment to maximize
profits, causing a shift to an hourly rate or a significant increase in claims to
make up for the reduced return in contingent fees.10 5 Thus, the potential
unintended effects of reducing the economic barrier to litigation could be the
discrimination against those who cannot afford to pay upfront fees and the
straining of the health court docket.10 6 It remains uncertain whether the limited
venues will be able to deal with the influx of claims that the current system
weeds out, especially given the proposed shift from a compensation standard of
negligence to one of avoidability. 
107
4. An Avoidability Standard for Compensation and a Predetermined
Noneconomic Damages Schedule
In response to the inability of the current tort system to compensate patients
who have suffered avoidable injuries, health court advocates have proposed
relaxing the standard for compensation from negligence to avoidability.
0 8
"Avoidable adverse events are injuries that are (1) caused by treatment (or the
omission of treatment) and (2) should rarely ... occur when care is provided
according to best practice. ' ' 09 By switching to an avoidability standard, the pool
of potential claims would expand to include patients who suffered avoidable
injuries not due to negligence. ° Researchers have estimated the avoidability
standard to allow twice as many potential litigants as the negligence standard. '
Damages awarded to successful plaintiffs in health courts would include
economic damages (for medical costs and lost income)1 12 and a predetermined
104. See Common Good, supra note 6.
105. See infra Section II.C. It is possible that, despite the lower transactional cost per trial,
attorneys may not be able to profit from litigating health court claims with the 20% contingent-fee
cap; if this were the case, taking on more cases would not adequately sustain their income stream.
Without the financial incentives that the current litigation system offers, attorneys may lose interest
in litigating malpractice claims altogether, perhaps facilitating a more administrative version of
health courts with pro se litigants. For purposes of discussion, however, this Note assumes that the
twenty-percent cap on contingency fees will not force attorneys out of the malpractice equation.
106. See id.
107. See id.; infra Section III.B.
108. See Mello et al., supra note 49, at 466 (characterizing the avoidability standard as
"occup[ying] a middle ground between the standards of strict liability... and negligence");
Howard, supra note 75.
109. Mello et al., supra note 49, at 466.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 467.
112. Id. Surprisingly, Professor Michelle Mello qualifies the full compensation of economic
15
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sum to cover noneconomic damages for the particular injury, set by another panel
of experts. 1 13 Because jury compositions and determinations vary by case, there
is little consistency among awards of noneconomic and even economic
damages. 114 A team of researchers from Common Good and the Harvard School
of Public Health plans to propose a schedule for automatic compensation of
noneconomic damages on an injury-specific basis to reimburse victims 1 5 "based
on decision-science research about how the public values various utility losses
and public deliberation about reasonable compensation. ' 1 6 By removing the
shaky calculus of jury negligence and award determinations, the intended
consequence of this no-fault compensation would be twofold: quicker and more
predictable victim compensation and prevention of medical errors for patient
safety.
According to proponents of the rate schedule, "[health care providers would]
be able to say, 'If this happens, we pay, no matter what,"' thus providing quicker
payouts to injured patients, 17 especially those with less severe injuries who are
left uncompensated due to the trial lawyer screening process. 1 8 Moreover, by not
focusing on negligence, the rate schedule supports disclosure of medical errors
and improvement in the health care system.' 19 Nevertheless, the combination of
expert judges and rate schedule causes some consumer advocates to characterize
the health court proposal as "not only depriv[ing] plaintiffs of the right to a trial
by jury but also... establish[ing] caps on noneconomic damages .... This is
totally an attempt to give HMOs, hospitals and doctors a private tribunal where
there's little justice but a lot of predictability for defendants."'' 2o During the June
2006 Senate committee hearings, the American Bar Association (ABA) testified
to the inherent unfairness of the rate schedule: "Would it be fair to award a pre-
fixed award for negligence that resulted in a paralyzed hand for a surgeon, lost or
impaired vision for an artist, or lost or impaired hearing for a musician?" 12'
damages by suggesting "some kind of eligibility threshold ... to control the number and costs of
claims brought." Id. The implementation of such a threshold seems reminiscent of the current
system's litigation bar, and contrary to her efforts in addressing "the undercompensation problem."
113. Common Good, supra note 6.
114. Eliasberg, supra note 33. Recognizing the lack of consistency in jury awards, researchers
submitted the same fact pattern to 120 mock six person juries and found a standard deviation of
$344,566 in the noneconomic damage awards. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments
about Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways To Increase Consistency, 48
DEPAUL L. REv. 301, 305, 314 & tbl.3 (1998).
115. Eliasberg, supra note 33.
116. Mello et al., supra note 49, at 468.
117. Eliasberg., supra note 33 (quoting Professor Troyen Brennan, who helped develop the
Common Good model).
118. See Mello et al., supra note 49, at 464.
119. Id. at 473.
120. Romano, supra note 25, at 26 (quoting Jamie Court, Executive Dir., Found. for Taxpayer
& Consumer Rights).
121. ABA Network, Tort Law: Health Courts, http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/
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Essentially, proponents intend for health courts to promote predictability and
the compensation of victims via the implementation of four logistical elements:
determination of physician negligence by expert judges, solicitation of testimony
from neutral experts, restriction of attorney profits, and distribution of
noneconomic damage awards through the use of the rate schedule. The risks
related to the implementation of health courts, however, outweigh the limited
benefit they may offer over the current litigation scheme. Given the drastic nature
of the proposed changes, it is important to compare the two models before
committing to a complete overhaul of medical malpractice litigation.
II. Comparing Health Courts to the Traditional Tort System
In Pennsylvania--one of the AMA's crisis states 22 and a likely grant
candidate under the Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act-the Project on
Medical Liability independently explored litigation alternatives, including the
feasibility of the implementation of special health courts, such as those proposed
by Common Good.123 Funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Project's
mission was to serve as an independent, impartial voice on medical liability, and
malpractice issues and provide decision-makers with objective information about
the ways in which medical, legal, and insurance-related issues affect the medical
liability system and malpractice reforms.' 24 Ultimately, despite the model's
endorsement by the president of the Pennsylvania Medical Society, 125 the Project
characterized the health court model as "unpromising," and concluded that "[a]n
examination of the court proposed for Pennsylvania... reveals serious risks of
increased politicization [of the bench], narrowed judicial perspective, and greater
costs to litigants."'' 26 The Project found that Common Good's goals could be
accomplished without a complete overhaul of the traditional litigation system.
127
After exploring the birth and evolution of medical malpractice in the United
healthcourts.html (last visited May 3, 2007).
122. See Am. Med. Ass'n, supra note 15.
123. Press Release, The Pew Charitable Trusts, Pew Trusts Invest $3.2 Million to Research
Medical Liability in Pennsylvania and Identify Possible Reforms (Mar. 15, 2002),
http://www.pewtrusts.com/ideas/ideasitem.cfm?contentitem-id=986&contenttypeid= 1 6&issue
_name=Medical%201iability&issue=32&page=16&name=Pew/o20Press%20Releases; see also
CATHERINE T. STRUVE, PROJECT ON MED. LIAB. IN PA., EXPERTISE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION: SPECIAL COURTS, SCREENING PANELS, & OTHER OPTIONS 2-3 (2003).
124. See Project on Medical Liability in Pennsylvania, http://www.pewtrusts.org/ideas/
indx.cfm?issue=32 (last visited May 3, 2007).
125. William W. Lander, Malpractice-A Medical Crisis: It's Time for Special Health Courts in
Pennsylvania, TRIB.-DEMOCRAT, Oct. 14, 2005, available at http://www.tribune-
democrat.com/siteSearch/apstorysection/localstory_287100437.html.
126. STRUVE, supra note 123, at 4-5.
127. Id. at 80-81. "[P]rocedural reform should focus ... on supporting the efforts of judges and
juries to assess scientific and medical questions and on providing guidance for the award and
review of noneconomic damages." Id. at 91.
17
Chow: Health Courts: An Extreme Makeover of Medical Malpractice with Po
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS(
States, this Part compares Common Good's health court model with the
traditional tort system in terms of equity of judgments, transactional costs,
efficiency of dispute resolution and compensation, liability insurance premiums,
and the cost of health care.
A. The History ofAmerican Medical Malpractice Litigation
Written in the 1760s, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
introduced the American colonies to the concept of medical malpractice as
"[i]njuries ... by the neglect or unskilful [sic] management of [a person's]
physician, surgeon, or apothecary... because it breaks the trust which the party
had placed in his physician, and tends to the patient's destruction.' 28 The first
actions against negligent physicians, however, did not begin to surface in the
United States until the middle of the 1800s with the onset of "marketplace
professionalism."'' 29 Because the states avoided regulating professions like
medicine and law, herbal healers competed with European-trained surgeons for
the business of health care consumers. 130 The lack of regulation and a uniform
standard of care forced victims of malpractice to seek recourse by holding
individual practitioners to whatever standard the victim or the victim's lawyer
wanted to impose. 31 Courts aided the growth of the budding legal field by easing
requirements for initiating tort claims, leading to an "explosion of medical
malpractice suits" and a 950% increase in appellate review from 1840 to 1860.132
Although most physicians initially embraced the idea of weeding out their
negligent peers, by 1850,
the nation's best-educated and most professionally minded physicians observed
with a sort of defensive incredulity and disbelieving horror that many, if not
most, of the burgeoning numbers of malpractice suits were being lodged not
against charlatans and amateur hacks, but against others like themselves, the
best-educated and most successful physicians. 1
33
As patients increasingly sued the more wealthy physicians instead of the herbal
healers who had fewer assets, physicians in the 1850s largely "regarded the
spread of malpractice litigation as a quasi-revolutionary assault,"'134 with one
famously stating that malpractice lawyers "follow us as the shark does the
emigrant ship."' 
35
128. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES * 122.




133. Id. at 1732-33.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1733-34.
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The advent of liability insurance at the end of the nineteenth century solved
the liability problem for individual physicians and thus rendered tort actions the
main vehicle for victim compensation.136 Despite the medical advancements
achieved over the last 150 years, medical malpractice litigation and the
polarization of the medical and legal communities that began in the mid-1800s
still exist today.137 Only now, doctors are fleeing states with the highest liability
insurance premiums, and some commentators worry that this exodus will limit
the availability of care in some areas of the country.' 38 Though most can agree
that change is needed, it is crucial to ensure that the proposed alternative will in
fact solve the problems associated with the traditional litigation system.
B. Equity of Judgments
Proponents of Common Good's health court model seek to prevent the
inequities of the current system-namely, the under-compensation of actual
malpractice victims, the unfair compensation of meritless claims, and disparate
damage awards across fact patterns.139 A 1984 study of medical malpractice in
New York hospitals estimated that about 27,179 cases of negligence occurred in
the state, but only 415 (1.5%) resulted in legal action, suggesting an
overwhelming number of uncompensated patients. 140 A 1999 Institute of
Medicine report approximated that 98,000 patients may die of preventable
medical mistakes annually. "41 Ultimately, "[t]oo few claims are asserted, in that
many of those injured by medical negligence never bring a claim; yet too many
claims are asserted, in that some suits turn out to lack merit."'142 These
statistics---coupled with the fact that defendants win about 75% to 80% of
malpractice cases 143 -suggest that plaintiffs often file meritless claims and try to
convince juries to award unfair compensation payments. The variability of
noneconomic damage awards across juries further compounds the compensation
problem. 144 Common Good's health court proposal builds on these assumptions
136. Id. at 1735.
137. Id. at 1731-37.
138. Scalpel, Scissors, Lawyer, supra note 69, at 51 ("Pennsylvania lost a third of its general
surgeons between 1995 and 2002.").
139. See Mello et al., supra note 49, at 465-66.
140. Localio et al., supra note 56, at 248 fig. 1.
141. INST. OF MED., NAT'L ACAD. OF Scis., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH
SYSTEM 1 (1999).
142. Struve, supra note 34, at 34. But see Romano, supra note 25, at 26 ("The percentage of
[medical malpractice] cases that go to trial... is typically lower than most other tort claims.")
(quoting Professor Catherine Struve, Univ. of Penn. Law School).
143. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS
AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001 (2004) (reporting that "[t]he overall win rate for medical
malpractice plaintiffs (27%) was about half of that found among plaintiffs in all tort trials (52%)"),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mmtvlc0l.pdf, Eliasberg, supra note 33.
144. Diamond et al., supra note 114, at 318 & tbl.3 (noting a high variability in noneconomic
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to push for adjudication by expert judges as a way to achieve equity and
accuracy. 145
1. Processing Expert Testimony: The Jury Versus Expert Judges
Perhaps the most radical component of the health court model is the
substitution of expert judges for the civil jury-the poster scapegoat for the
malpractice crisis. 146 A staple in the traditional tort regime, the jury "by
definition [is] an ... experience in the conduct of serious human affairs that,
virtually from its inception, has been the subject of deep controversy."' 147 Juries
in medical malpractice trials must discern whether a defendant physician's
conduct was reasonable given the medical custom standard set forth by expert
testimony. 148 "When the jury is working well, it represents a fair cross-section of
the community... [which] seems better than relying on an elite group who all
have similar training and biases that go along with that training-whether in law
school or medical school."' 149 This ignorance, however, necessitates education on
the appropriate standard of care by "hired gun" experts, which perpetuates
inconsistent verdicts across juries.
By replacing lay juries with judges with medical expertise, health courts
offer increased consistency in the determination of standards of care. Instead of
listening to experts hired by the parties, judges would have the authority to
consult neutral experts in each area of medicine,1 50 thus eliminating adversarial
testimony: "The point is not to shield bad doctors from legal consequences but to
ensure that judgments are based on sound science rather than on compelling
theatrics."'' 51 Intuitively, the jury's unfamiliarity with complex medical
terminology and procedures, combined with the presentation of sympathetic fact
patterns, suggests a bias that might unfairly favor a victim plaiqfiff.
In reality, defendants win most malpractice verdicts. 52 A Bureau of Justice
Statistics study on medical malpractice trials and verdicts in the country's
damage awards in a study of 120 mock juries).
145. See Common Good, supra note 6.
146. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 73 ("Fear of erratic jury decisions in medical malpractice
cases has spawned a culture of fear, causing inefficiencies that infect every level of medicine.").
147. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3-4 (1966).
148. Jay Alexander Gold, Wiser Than the Laws? The Legal Accountability of the Medical
Profession, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 179 (1981).
149. Eliasberg, supra note 33 (quoting Professor Nancy Marder). See also Nancy S. Marder,
The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 877, 932 (1999) ("At the heart of the jury
system ... is a belief that jurors will bring to the task of judging their sense of justice.... [T]he
jury often has been described as representing the 'conscience of the community.').
150. Common Good, supra note 6.
151. MacLennan et al., supra note 74, at 1689.
152. Eliasberg, supra note 33. But see Localio et al., supra note 56, at 248 tbl.3 ("Of the 280
patients who had adverse events caused by medical negligence as defined by the study protocol,
eight filed malpractice claims.").
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seventy-five largest counties in 2001 found that "[t]he overall win rate for
medical malpractice plaintiffs ... was [27%, which was] about half of that found
among plaintiffs in all tort trials [52%]."' 153 Plus, courts later reduce nearly half
of jury verdicts, 154 indicating judicial review of the more outlying awards. The
media fuels the perception of plaintiff-friendly juries awarding frequent windfall
payments by reporting cases with verdicts between four and thirty-four times
greater than the average case.i15
For example, in November 2005, the media reported that a six-member
Connecticut jury awarded a record $36.5 million' 56 to the family of a six-year-
old Nicholas Cowles, who was blind and brain-damaged and suffered from
cerebral palsy (CP) due to injuries sustained during delivery by a surrogate
mother. 157 Nicholas was present at trial, and jury foreman Julia Torres
commented that "we all wanted to reach out and hug him."' 158 The jury found that
the obstetrician failed to properly interpret data from an electronic fetal
monitoring (EFM) device, which should have indicated that the fetus was in
distress. 159 The length of the difficult delivery was so long that it caused the fetus
to suffer from a dangerous increase in blood acidity, and jurors concluded that
Nicholas should have been delivered via Caesarean section long before he
actually was. 160 Torres said "[h]ad the Caesarean been performed even [thirty]
minutes earlier, Nicholas would be fine today. It was just tragic that it happened
that way."161
Jurors in the Cowles trial found the appropriate standard of care to include
use of the data from the monitoring strips in determining the necessity of a C-
section. 162 As average American citizens with limited medical backgrounds, they
undoubtedly reached their decision by weighing the testimony of dueling
experts. 163 This reliance on expert testimony is a necessary component of a lay
jury's decision-making process and propagates the perception of arbitrary
decisions. Health courts could potentially remedy this through judicial selection
153. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 143.
154. Joseph T. Hallinan, In Malpractice Trials, Juries Rarely Have the Last Word, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 30, 2004, at Al.
155. Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem,
Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 463 (2004).
156. The $36.5 million Cowles award is nearly sixteen times greater than the median award for
malpractice in childbirth cases of $2.3 million, MacLennan et al., supra note 74, at 1688, and
eighty-six times the average malpractice award of $320,000, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18,
at 4.






163. See Gold, supra note 148, at 179.
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of a "neutral expert," 164 but it is unclear what characteristics a "neutral expert"
might possess or whether neutral experts even exist in such a controversial area
of medicine.
In fact, most clinicians do not believe that babies acquire CP from the failure
of the obstetrician to deliver them by C-section. 165 Studies conducted on the
efficacy of EFM patterns, like those presented in the Cowles trial, have
demonstrated that the use of EFM "has not led to a decreased rate of [CP].'
166
Still, the fear of litigation pushes some doctors to perform unnecessary C-
sections, exposing mothers to increased risks of hemorrhage, infection, and
postpartum complications. 67 A 2006 study examined characteristics of repeat
expert witnesses in 827 neurologic birth injury cases and identified 71 physicians
who participated in 738 (or 89%) of the selected cases. 1
68
If the EFM read-outs that acted as the foundation for the Cowles case are not
an effective method for determining fetal distress, then these hired medical
experts should cease perpetuating those beliefs. Even members of the medical
community have suggested that professional schools should "train, register, and
audit those offering medicolegal opinion," such that "any expert asserting that a
CP outcome was preventable.., should have to produce evidence of good
medical quality that the advocated policy has reduced rates of CP.', 169 Thus, if
the medical community desires a uniform standard of care, it should police
medical experts and their testimony to reflect accepted standards of the medical
profession. Implementing measures to ensure the accountability of these experts
would significantly minimize the effect of dueling experts on lay juries without
depriving malpractice victims of a jury trial.
Furthermore, taking malpractice cases away from juries may be
unwarranted. A 2006 study conducted at the Harvard School of Public Health
challenges the common view among tort reformers that the traditional tort
scheme entertains and cultivates frivolous claims. 170 Out of a random sample of
1452 completed malpractice claims from five insurers, 3% did not involve
medical injuries and 37% did not involve medical errors; 171 in other words, the
Harvard researchers agreed with the verdicts of a majority of lay juries.
According to lead researcher Professor David Studdert, "We found the system
did reasonably well in sorting the good claims from the bad ones, but there were
164. Common Good, supra note 6.
165. MacLennan et al., supra note 74, at 1688; Scalpel, Scissors, Lawyer, supra note 67, at 52.
166. MacLennan et al., supra note 74, at 1689.
167. Id.
168. Aaron S. Kesselheim & David M. Studdert, Characteristics of Physicians Who Frequently
Act As Expert Witnesses in Neurologic Birth Injury Litigation, 108 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
273, 275 (2006). The judgments for the 827 cases totaled $2.9 billion. Id.
169. MacLennan et al., supra note 74, at 1689.
170. See David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2024 (2006).
171. Id. at 2026, 2028 fig.1.
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problems."'' 72 Still, these problems do not seem to warrant an overhaul of the
entire system, especially with the availability of modest but effective
supplemental reforms. 1
73
2. Preventing the Practice of Defensive Medicine and Establishing a
Standard of Care
Howard has explained that, "[a] reliable system of medical justice could take
many forms, but... the key element must be expert judges ruling on standards of
care."1 74 The veritable lack of a uniform standard of care has led to the practice
of defensive medicine-defined as "a deviation from sound medical practice that
is induced primarily by a threat of liability.', 175 Although the phenomenon is well
documented, 176 researchers do not agree on the amount spent on defensive
medicine, and the topic remains highly controversial, because it is difficult to
isolate what services are solely defensive.
A recent study supported by the Project on Medical Liability in
Pennsylvania found that nine out of ten physicians in six especially high-risk
specialties practice defensive medicine ranging from ordering extra tests to
avoiding patients perceived to pose a litigation risk.177 The Office of Technology
Assessment, however, found that "a relatively small proportion of all diagnostic
procedures-certainly less than 8 percent overall-is performed primarily due to
conscious concern about malpractice liability risk."'178 The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) determined "[o]n the basis of existing studies and its own
research... that savings from reducing defensive medicine would be very
small," with no statistically significant discrepancy in health care spending per
capita between states with restrictive limits on malpractice claims and states
without them.' 7 9 Still, the reduction of unnecessary and potentially harmful
invasive procedures like biopsies is needed and may come with the development
of uniform clinical standards of care. 1
80
The written decisions by the expert judges presiding over health courts
172. Alicia Chang, Study Asserts Many Medical Malpractice Suits Groundless, HOUSTON
CHRON., May 11, 2006, at A11.
173. Diamond et al., supra note 114, at 318.
174. Philip K. Howard, Op-Ed., The Best Course of Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2003, at
A15.
175. Studdert et al., supra note 16, at 2616.
176. See id; OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE (1994); P.C. Coyte et al., Medical Malpractice: The Canadian Experience, 324 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 89 (1991); N. Summerton, Positive and Negative Factors in Defensive Medicine: A
Questionaire Study of General Practitioners, 3 10 BRITISH MED. J. 27 (1995).
177. Studdert et al., supra note 16, at 2616.
178. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 176, at 74 (emphasis added).
179. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 6.
180. Studdert et al., supra note 16, at 2617.
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would serve to establish uniform precedents and guidelines for patient care. '81
Appointed by a nonpartisan screening committee, the judges would adjudicate
only health care matters. 182 Unlike generalist judges and lay juries, expert
medical judges could rely upon their familiarity with medical custom to more
accurately apply the appropriate standard of care and to achieve consistency
across the state.
Some jurisdictions, however, are moving towards a "reasonable physician"
standard of care instead of the traditional medical custom standard, thus
minimizing the desirability of expert judges skilled at hearing the traditional
standard. 183 Generalist judges may be better equipped to determine the
reasonable care standard by drawing upon their familiarity with other tort areas.
Along with specialization in a particular field of law comes de-familiarization
with other legal doctrines, such that "the specialists' field may diverge from the
larger body of law and may also lose the benefit of experience in other fields." 1
84
Moreover, because health courts cover such a narrow and highly contentious
area of law, there is an extremely high risk of politicization of the health court
bench. 185 The ABA's Commission on the Twenty-First Century Judiciary found
that recent state judicial election campaigns have been politicized due to the
participation of "interest groups that formed to promote a specific political
issue."'' 86 Given the highly polarized atmosphere of the malpractice issue, neither
the appointment nor the election of medical judges could be expected to escape
intense lobbying by consumer groups, trial attorneys, physicians, and insurance
providers. 187
In the current litigation system, the incentives to lobby for a sympathetic
judge are muted by the fact that malpractice cases are distributed among a
number of judges, each of whom hears only a small portion of the total claims in
any given state. In other words, the threat of politicization is spread out over
many judges hearing many kinds of cases. With fewer venues and fewer judges,
the political pressures applied from all sides of the malpractice debate would
inevitably pervade the health court bench, jeopardizing the goal of providing "a
reliable system of medical justice." 1
88
181. Common Good, supra note 6.
182. Id.
183. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 164 (2000).
184. STRUVE, supra note 123, at 75.
185. Id.
186. AM. BAR ASS'N, COMM'N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 22
(2003).
187. See STRUVE, supra note 123, at 74.
188. Id. at 69.
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C. Per Trial and Net Transactional Costs
Perhaps the greatest inequities of the current system are the inaccessibility of
the courtroom to malpractice victims with lesser damages and the under-
compensation of successful victim plaintiffs. ' 89 Both of these sources of inequity
are related to the transactional costs of the traditional tort system: "Those patients
with small claims often cannot find a lawyer to represent them, while those who
win find their lawyers have swallowed half the payout from the doctors."' 
90
Research has revealed that sixty cents of every dollar paid in malpractice
premiums go to legal fees, court costs, and other administrative expenses, leaving
only forty cents per dollar to compensate victims of medical negligence. 91 In
2002, the average malpractice claim payment had increased to $320,000. 192 Thus,
after paying off all litigation-related expenses, the average victim receives only
$128,000 to cover damages.
Common Good's health court proposal seeks to make litigation more
affordable to those injured by negligence through adjudication by an expert
tribunal, education of the tribunal by neutral experts, and a 20% cap on
contingency fees. 193 Without the expenses of assembling a jury, compensating
dueling experts, or relinquishing 20% of damages to trial attorneys, the cost of
litigating in health courts is estimated by Common Good to be half of what it is
now. 194 Because health court cases would be less expensive to litigate per trial,
fewer claimants would choose to settle, 195 and more victims with less severe
injuries would gain access to the courts. Nevertheless, attorneys make the
ultimate decision of whether a claim should be litigated; if their contingent fees
are halved, they would theoretically need to seek claims with larger payouts or
litigate more claims to maintain their profit.' 
96
Currently, sixteen states restrict contingent fees in medical malpractice or
189. See Mello et al., supra note 49, at 465-66 ("A major shortcoming of the current tort
liability system is that the negligence standard leaves many patients with preventable injuries
ineligible for compensation. Because only about one in four injuries related to hospital treatment
can be attributed to negligence, the majority of injured patients cannot access the current
compensation system." (citations omitted)).
190. Scalpel, Scissors, Lawyer, supra note 67.
191. 151 CONG. REc. 7635 (daily ed. June 29, 2005) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
192. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 3-4. The average malpractice claim payment in
1986 totaled $95,000. Id.
193. Common Good, supra note 6.
194. Id.
195. But see STRUVE, supra note 123, at 77 (finding that the decreased convenience-
particularly for malpractice plaintiffs-might lead to an increase in dropped and settled claims,
despite the potential availability of more experienced counsel concentrated near the court locales).
196. Without the expenses associated with hiring expert witnesses, the malpractice attorney may
determine that a 20% contingent fee is an attractive return for some cases. See supra notes 98-107
and accompanying text.
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personal injury cases.197 When states limit fees to less than the usual 33% for
personal injury cases, attorneys have less economic incentive to screen each case
carefully for the likelihood of a large payout. 198 Therefore, capping contingent
fees leads to one of two potential outcomes: abandonment of the contingent fee
for an hourly rate or a significant increase in claims filed by trial attorneys to
compensate for the reduced return in contingent fees.' 99 Either result threatens to
undo the proposed benefits of health courts.
Contingency fees improve access to courts for low-income plaintiffs because
lawyers are paid from the settlement or judgment and not the client's pocket.2 °°
An hourly rate prevents less wealthy litigants from bringing claims, as it requires
paying attorney fees prior to and regardless of any recovery. The use of an hourly
rate, instead of contingent fees, would shift the burden of under-compensation
from victims with the least severe injuries to victims with the least financial
resources. This hardly seems to be the right result because, arguably, the most
impoverished victims need compensation from damages the most. Payment of
attorneys' fees by the hour also discourages efficiency and settlement, such that a
plaintiff may pay high hourly rates without ever receiving any compensation for
201the malpractice injury.
On the other hand, capping contingent fees might push malpractice attorneys
to relax the practice of screening malpractice claims, potentially causing an
influx of claims into the court system that are currently not considered worth
litigating. This enhanced access to the courtroom for malpractice victims with
less severe injuries is certainly one of the health court model's major selling
points; however, increased courtroom access directly translates to increased
litigation. As health courts would necessarily operate in regular sessions in
limited venues, a boost in the number of claims could clog the circuits. For
example, a proposed model for health courts in Pennsylvania provided for six
circuit level courts to replace the sixty judicial districts available to hear
197. See ALEXANDER TABARROK & ERIC HELLAND, Two CHEERS FOR CONTINGENT FEES 16-17
tbl. 1 (2005). For a fifty-state survey of restrictions on attorneys' fees, see NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE MEDICAL LIABILITY LAWS TABLE (2002), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/insur/medliability.pdf. In 2005, twelve states considered legislation
that would restrict contingent fees. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, State Medical
Malpractice Reform: 2005 Numbers at a Glance, http://www.ncsl.org/standconmi/sclaw/
medmalataglance.htm (last visited May 3, 2007).
198. See TABARROK & HELLAND, supra note 197, at 18 tbl.2. A 2005 study conducted by
Professors Alexander Tabarrok and Eric Helland found that, in states with restrictions on
contingent fees, 18% of cases dropped before trial without settlement, and that, in states without
restrictions, only 5% of cases dropped. Id. The researchers concluded that the data demonstrated
the connection between contingent fees and trial-lawyer screening. Id. at 15.
199. See id. at 10-11.
200. G.M. Filisko, Fee Caps Won't Solve Liability Crisis, Study Says, ABA J., Sept. 23, 2005.
201. See Tabarrok, supra note 99 (reporting that "the time to settlement in medical malpractice
cases is 22% longer in states that restrict contingent fees" and that, in the year following the
enactment of Florida's contingent-fee restrictions in 1985, "settlement time increased by 13%").
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malpractice claims under the current system. Health courts may mean quicker
trials, 20 3 but, with a limited number of courts and a flood of claims, it is unclear
how the courts would handle such an overwhelming caseload.
While the cost of each health court trial might be markedly less, the total
cost of compensating more litigated claims could drive up the net transactional
cost of the health court system, perhaps surpassing the estimated $6.5 billion
spent on defending malpractice claims (including plaintiff awards, legal costs,
and underwriting costs) in 2001.2o4 Thus, although it would theoretically provide
increased accessibility to the courtroom, the health court model would also
impose increased stress on the system, perhaps diluting the benefits of lowering
the litigation bar. Even Professor Troyen A. Brennan, a member of the Common
Good project, concedes that "[a]n increase in the number of medical errors
reported, and compensated, could drive overall malpractice costs up as much as
fourfold., 20 5 In other words, decreasing the cost per malpractice trial makes
litigation an attractive option for more plaintiffs, leading to more trials, more
compensation, and a higher net transactional cost.
20 6
In contrast, there is some certainty in the current litigation system. Despite
the obvious injustice of a $200,000 bar to litigation,20 7 the prelitigation screening
of malpractice claims by trial attorneys has kept the number of malpractice
claims filed each year remarkably stable. 20 8 Statistics released from the National
Center for State Courts disclosed that malpractice claims per 100,000 people
actually decreased by 1% from 1992 to 2001.209 In general, the total number of
federal and state lawsuits filed each year climaxed in the mid-1980s and has
drastically decreased ever since. 210 Thus, practically speaking, it seems more
productive to focus on the reform of a stable system with a constant number of
lawsuits, than to implement a new scheme with uncertain and potentially
devastating consequences.
D. Efficiency in Dispute Resolution and Compensation
Closely tied to increasing access to the courtroom is the efficiency in dispute
resolution and compensation. Data collected by the National Practitioner Data
Bank showed that the national average time from injury to payout in malpractice
cases in 2004 was 4.61 years-one week longer than the 2003 average. 211 This
202. STRUVE, supra note 123, at 77.
203. Common Good, supra note 6.
204. Anderson et al., supra note 1, at 910.
205. Eliasberg, supra note 33.
206. See infra Section III.B.
207. See Romano, supra note 25, at 26.
208. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 4.
209. Romano, supra note 25, at 26.
210. Rhode, supra note 155, at 456-57.
211. NAT'L PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2004 ANNUAL
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"payment delay" ranged from 2.81 years in South Dakota to 6.69 years in Rhode
Island. Unlike the current tort system, Common Good's health court model
separates the determinations of liability (and economic damages) and
compensation for noneconomic damages: expert judges establish whether
malpractice occurred and the amount of economic losses, while a predetermined
rate schedule sets noneconomic damages for various injuries.212 Without the need
to educate a jury, Common Good claims that its procedure will significantly
increase efficiency in terms of dispute resolution and compensation such that
"[m]ost cases would be resolved within months. 213 Though it seems that each
health court trial will take less time from injury to compensation, the net effect of
increased litigation could be a clogged docket, causing even longer payment
delays than those found in the current system.
In 2004, Pennsylvania's average payment delay was 5.58 years 214-nearly a
year longer than the national average.215 The health court model proposed there
would have three-judge panels sitting in six venues across the state.216 Because
health courts would have original jurisdiction for all medical malpractice claims,
these six courts would hear all of Pennsylvania's malpractice claims, which are
now dispersed through sixty judicial districts. 217 Siphoning out malpractice
claims would likely make the judicial system as a whole more efficient, but with
an influx of more litigation due to the decreased cost per trial, the health court
docket could quickly become overwhelmed.218 Moreover, "courts need not be
specialized in order to implement strategies to reduce delay, such as active case
management and the imposition of deadlines on discovery and dispositive
,,219motions.
E. Liability Insurance Premiums
One of the driving forces behind the search for litigation alternatives is the
ever-rising cost of liability insurance for physicians, especially in high-risk
specialties like obstetrics-gynecology, surgery, anesthesiology, emergency
medicine, and radiology. 220 In 2004, Rick Miller, a neurosurgeon in New
Hampshire, refused to treat the president of the New Hampshire Trial Lawyers
REPORT 31, 72 tbl. 13 (2004), available at http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov/pubs/stats/
2004_NPDBAnnualReport.pdf.
212. See Common Good, supra note 6; Mello et al., supra note 49, at 467-68.
213. Common Good, supra note 6.
214. NAT'L PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, supra note 211, at 72 tbl. 13.
215. Id. at 31.
216. STRUVE, supra note 123, at 71.
217. Id.
218. See supra Section II.C.
219. STRUVE, supra note 123, at 72.
220. Daniel P. Kessler et al., Impact of Malpractice Reforms on the Supply of Physician
Services, 293 JAMA 2618, 2619 (2005).
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Association because of the latter's lobbying efforts against limits on malpractice
suits. 221 Considered the best neurosurgeon on the Sea Coast, Miller paid $84,151
a year for liability insurance, leaving him with only $64,000 after business costs
and taxes.222
That's less than my malpractice premium. This puts in perspective how
desperate the situation is. Attorneys who choose to speak out and try to derail
efforts at meaningful tort reform do so at some risk-that they will not be able
to come to the best neurosurgeon in New Hampshire. They'll have to go
elsewhere, the same way that patients will have to go elsewhere if neurosurgery
is no longer available on the Sea Coast.
223
Though most doctors have not bought into the refuse-to-treat tactic, they
undoubtedly share Miller's concern for their own survival and for the availability
of health care; after all, "[i]f physicians in [high-risk] specialties find coverage
unaffordable and limit or abandon their practices, the entire health care system
potentially fails.,
224
In marketing health courts to the medical community, Common Good
implies that its model can counter "[s]tunning increases in medical malpractice
premiums," thus encouraging the practice of medicine and enhancing availability
of health care. 225 Apparently, the organization's claim that insurers will lower
malpractice premiums relies on the normalization and subsequent predictability
of damages.226 By implementing a rate schedule to determine damages specific to
a victim's injuries and abolishing the use of lay juries, health courts effectively
rule out the possibility of capricious awards for noneconomic damages, which
227Common Good claims collectively drive up malpractice premiums.227 Whether
the model can live up to its proposed goal of protecting physicians from the cost
of growing premiums remains uncertain.
Although malpractice litigation is frequently blamed for the current
malpractice crisis, researchers have observed that there is no clear-cut correlation
between trends in lawsuits and awards and trends in premiums or insurance
availability. 228 Insurance providers rely on the influx of premium payments and
investment capital to fund claim payments and other administrative costs.
2 2 9
221. Parker, supra note 9.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Sage, supra note 11, at 473.
225. Common Good, supra note 6.
226. See Mello et al., supra note 49, at 470 ("[A] health court system presents greater possibility
for cost control than the tort system does.... Whether malpractice litigation costs currently exceed
the socially optimal level is controversial, but the desirability of being able to control the system's
costs should not be.") (citation omitted).
227. See Common Good, supra note 6.
228. Sage, supra note 11, at 470.
229. Id.
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Premiums for malpractice insurance are set so that, over time, insurers' income
from those premiums equals their total costs-including a competitive return to
their investors-less any excess funds in reserve. 230 This insurance underwriting
reflects everything from the potential risks of medical advances to the public
perception of medical error.231
Malpractice premiums are a poor reflection of current litigation trends,
"[b]ecause liability insurers hold premium dollars for many years before paying
them out to claimants [and] the long tail also makes current pricing depend to a
greater extent on investment income than is typical of other forms of
insurance.232 With the average malpractice claim taking nearly five years to
resolve233 and some injuries being inherently latent, insurance companies must
project years, and sometimes decades, into the future.234 Data regarding formulas
for underwriting insurance premiums has not been collected reliably on a
national level, making research and studies on the topic particularly difficult.
235
The first medical malpractice crisis surfaced in 1975, when many
commercial insurance providers ceased or threatened to stop giving liability
coverage.236 During the next crisis in the mid-1980s, malpractice premiums
increased significantly for a couple of years in response to a speculated increase
in claims by insurance companies.237 Ultimately, their speculations were too
high, and insurers placed the surplus funds into reserves, which subsequently
lightened the premiums for the 1990s. 238 From 2000 to 2002, the average
malpractice premium for American physicians increased by 15%, with a 22%
increase for obstetricians-gynecologists and a 33% increase for internists and
general surgeons. 239 Given the cyclical nature of the insurance crises, it seems
that malpractice crises are the result of insurance underwriting-not of periods of
increased litigiousness or payouts24 0-and it is unclear how underwriters would
respond to the uncertainties of the health court model.24 1
230. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 3.
231. See Sage, supra note 11, at 480.
232. Id
233. NAT'L PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, supra note 211, at 31.
234. Sage, supra note 11, at 480-81.
235. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING
PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 40-41 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03836.pdf.
236. Sage, supra note 11, at 469.
237. See id. at 469-70; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 4-5.
238. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 4-5.
239. Id.
240. Sage, supra note 11, at 471.
241. Research suggests that even a systemic change accompanied by a sustained decrease in
payouts might not deflate premiums. One study examined Texas medical malpractice claims from
1988 to 2002 and concluded that "[n]o sudden rise in claim frequency, payments, defense costs, or
jury verdicts preceded or accompanied the premium spike that occurred in Texas after 1998." Black
et al., supra note 21, at 255.
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F. Cost of Health Care
Despite what Common Good has suggested, 242 reducing malpractice
premiums does not appear to have a significant effect on economic efficiency or
the affordability of health care for patients. In fact, research suggests that it is the
cost of treatment, not malpractice litigation, which accounts for the high cost of
health care in the United States.243 The CBO recently found that even a 25% to
30% savings in premiums can have only a small direct impact on health care
spending, because the cost of malpractice litigation accounts for less than 2% of
total health care spending in America, 244 regardless of the type of reform used to
achieve the premium reduction.
A recent Harris poll 245 found that 62% of American adults supported the
246
adjudication of medical malpractice cases in health courts. Implying a
correlation between large jury payouts and the price consumers pay to see their
doctors, Common Good appeals to the public by highlighting the rising cost of
health care and by offering the rate schedule for damages as an alternative to the
"random justice" of jury awards.24 7 Compensation based on the schedule would
award "so much for an arm... rather than by having jurors pluck a number out
of the air." 248 The schedule would normalize damage awards across fact patterns
and effectively act as a set of noneconomic damage caps itemized by injury.24 9
Many states that initially adopted noneconomic damage caps have since
repealed them on constitutional grounds, including Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, and Washington.2 U Wisconsin recently
242. Common Good, supra note 6.
243. Gerard F. Anderson et al., It's the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different
from Other Countries, 23 HEALTH AFF. 89 (2003).
244. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 6.
245. Harris Interactive is one of the largest market research firms in the country and also
manages the longest running independent opinion poll. Harris Interactive, About Us,
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/about/ (last visited May 3, 2007).
246. Common Good, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist Calls for the Creation of Special Health
Courts (July 19, 2004), http://cgood.org/healthcare-newscommentary-inthenews- 140.html.
247. Common Good, supra note 6.
248. Scalpel, Scissors, Lawyer, supra note 67.
249. See Eliasberg, supra note 33.
250. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-544 (2003), invalidated by Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Hodgen,
884 So. 2d 801, 813-14 (Ala. 2003) (holding that the cap on noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases violated the right to jury trial and the equal protection provisions of the Alabama
Constitution); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.1 (1996), invalidated by Best v. Taylor Mach.
Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1066-81 (Ill. 1997) (holding that the limitation on compensatory damages
for noneconomic injury violated the Illinois Constitution); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-270
(West 1980), invalidated by McCoy v. W. Baptist Hosp., 628 S.W.2d 634, 635 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981)
(finding the statutory cap unconstitutional as an invasion of the rule-making power of the courts);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (1980), invalidated by Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830-31
(N.H. 1980) (holding that the cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions violated
the equal protection clause of the New Hampshire Constitution); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-11
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implemented a second, significantly higher damage cap to replace the one struck
down in Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund.251
In that case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found statistics in Wisconsin
mirroring those in the CBO's report and held the state's $350,000 noneconomic
damage cap to be unconstitutional because
even if the $350,000 cap on non-economic damages would reduce medical
malpractice insurance premiums, this reduction would have no effect on a
consumer's health care costs. Accordingly, there is no objectively reasonable
basis to conclude that the $350,000 justifies placing such a harsh burden on the
most severely injured medical malpractice victims.
252
Between the Ferdon decision and the passage of the new cap, the Wisconsin
Hospitals Association reported that Wisconsin hospitals had difficulty recruiting
physicians and that the number of malpractice claims increased. 253 PIC
Wisconsin, the largest provider of liability insurance in the state, raised
premiums by 5% in January 2006, tentatively waiting for lawmakers and the state
supreme court to chart a new course.
254
Prior to signing the new $750,000 damage cap for malpractice cases,25 5
Governor Jim Doyle vetoed an attempt by the Wisconsin Legislature to pass a
$450,000 cap because the proposal "suffer[ed] from the exact same constitutional
defects" as the unconstitutional cap in Ferdon.256 The governor reportedly felt
that "[a]pproving a law that would be quickly overturned doesn't do anyone any
good., 257 The Ferdon court found that the $350,000 noneconomic damage cap
"was designed by the legislature to help limit the increasing cost of health care
(1977), invalidated by Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 131-36 (N.D. 1978) (holding that the
$300,000 cap on medical malpractice awards was a violation of equal protection); OR. REV. STAT. §
18.650(1) (1999), invalidated by Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 465-69 (Or. 1999)
(holding that the noneconomic damage cap unconstitutional for abridging the right to jury trial);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250 (1988), invalidated by Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711
(Wash. 1989) (holding that the noneconomic damage cap violated the Washington Constitution and
the right to a jury trial).
251. Wis. Office of the Governor, supra note 7; see also WIS. STAT. § 893.55 (2005),
invalidated by Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005)
(holding that the statutory cap failed to demonstrate a rational relationship to legislative objectives).
252. 701 N.W.2d at 485. See also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 6. The $350,000 cap
mentioned in Ferdon was indexed for inflation and reached $445,775 when the Wisconsin Supreme
Court struck it down in July 2005. David Wahlberg, Medical Malpractice Caps Have Little Effect
on Rates, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 5, 2006.
253. Stacy Forster & Derrick Nunnally, Doyle Vetoes Medical Malpractice Caps: Limits Too
Similar to Those Overturned by Court, Governor Says, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 2, 2005,
available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/state/dec05/375058.asp.
254. Id.
255. Wis. Office of the Governor, supra note 7.
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and possible 'diminishing ... availability of health care in Wisconsin.', 258
Ultimately, the court struck down the cap as unconstitutional because the
legislature failed to demonstrate a rational relationship to the legislative
objectives, finding that "the correlation between caps on noneconomic damages
and the reduction of medical malpractice premiums or overall health care costs is
at best indirect, weak, and remote. 259 Sixty-eight percent higher than the
unconstitutional cap in Ferdon,26 ° Wisconsin's legislature hopes that its new
$750,000 cap will not suffer the same fate as its predecessor and will return
stability to the state's malpractice environment.
Drawing from the concept of noneconomic damage caps, Common Good's
plan attempts to circumvent the inequity of capping all claims at the same
amount by creating a rate schedule for injury-specific noneconomic damages.26'
Damages awarded by health courts would include economic damages (such as
lost wages and hospital bills) and noneconomic damages according to the
schedule.262 Common Good equates this prevention of "random justice" with the
ability to provide affordable health care to consumers, but given the lesson
learned in Ferdon, it seems unlikely that providing varied injury-specific damage
caps would strengthen the link between restricting damage awards and lowering
the cost of health care.
In sum, health courts may lower the litigation bar to encourage victim
compensation and cultivate a uniform standard of care to guide physicians.
Unfortunately, they would also increase the new transactional cost of malpractice
litigation, postpone victim compensation, and raise liability insurance premiums
without providing significantly more equitable results 263 or lowering health care
costs. These shortcomings of the health court model can be suggested from a
piecemeal assessment of nontraditional litigation alternatives in California,
Wisconsin, and New Jersey.
III. CASE STUDIES
Outside of the unpopular refuse-to-treat tactic, the health court model is one
of the most radical approaches in battling the malpractice crisis. A drastic
258. Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 465 (Wis. 2005).
259. Id. at 485.
260. Press Release, Wis. Hosp. Ass'n, Hospitals Praise Bipartisan Vote on Damage Caps:
Senate Sends Bill to Gov. Doyle with Another Strong Vote (Mar. 8, 2006),
http://www.wha.org/newsCenter/pdf/nr3-8-06senateabI 073.pdf.
261. Eliasberg, supra note 33.
262. Common Good, supra note 6.
263. See, e.g., Mello et al., supra note 49, at 467 (conceding the realistic necessity of "cost
control"); infra Section III.C (discussing possible inequitable consequences of the health court
model). Mello suggests "some kind of eligibility threshold-a minimum.., of [four weeks] of
disability [and] a minimum amount of [$3,000 to $4,000 in] out-of-pocket expenses-.., in order
to control the number and costs of claims brought." Mello et al., supra note 49, at 467.
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departure from the current tort litigation scheme, health courts would funnel all
malpractice cases to limited venues in the state judiciary for adjudication by a
panel of expert judges. 264 As with any innovative and radical tort reform,
however, integration of specialized health courts into the American judiciary
system carries risks similar to other litigation alternatives: arbitration employs a
pool of subject-sophisticated arbitrators to award compensation in the absence of
direct consent; 265 medical mediation panels demonstrate the potential influx of
claims into the health court system without the deterrent effect of costly
litigation; 266 and mass tort courts are another form of specialized court
experiencing an overburdened docket. 267 Based on this piecemeal assessment, the
implementation of health courts may result in unfair compensation due to
politicization of the bench and the normalization of noneconomic injuries in the
rate schedule, significantly increased net transactional costs and malpractice
premiums, and delayed dispute resolution and compensation.
A. The Equity of Health Courts and California 's Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act's Arbitration Provision
268
In enacting the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), the
California legislature acknowledged the onset of America's first medical
malpractice crisis in the 1970s, 269 and "a potential breakdown of the health
delivery system, severe hardships for the medically indigent, a denial of access
for the economically marginal, and depletion of physicians such as to
substantially worsen the quality of heath care available to citizens of
[California].,, 270 Designed to improve the quality of health care in California, the
Act includes an arbitration provision, allowing patients and their health care
providers to agree that any future dispute will be adjudicated through binding
arbitration.27'
Although the AMA supports voluntary arbitration as a method to weed out
meritless claims from litigation,272 the American Arbitration Association
reported that only about 60 out of the 219,000 cases it handled in one year were
264. Mello et al., supra note 49, at 467.
265. See infra Section III.A.
266. See infra Section II1.B.
267. See infra Section III.C.
268. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 2005).
269. Sage, supra note 11, at 469.
270. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 note (West 2003).
271. CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE § 1295. Although the Federal Arbitration Act is the primary
authority on arbitration clauses in contracts governed by state law, states still have control over the
substantive content of the clauses. See David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a
Workable Model of "No-Fault" Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L.
& MED. 225, 236 (2001).
272. Romano, supra note 25, at 29.
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medical malpractice claims, which is equivalent to 0.03% of its caseload.
273
Given arbitration's reputation for doling out smaller awards, it is not surprising
that most medical malpractice arbitrations are triggered by adhesion contracts
rather than the will of the plaintiff. 274
For about thirty years, one of the largest HMOs in America, Kaiser
Permanente, has taken advantage of MICRA's arbitration provision by
"operat[ing] a mandatory, binding arbitration scheme to judge compensation for
medical injury claims arising in its facilities. 275 Even though Kaiser's contracts
waiving the right to litigation are repeatedly challenged for the absence of
informed consent,276 the California Supreme Court has continually broadened the
applicability of Kaiser's arbitration clause, reinforcing the state's confidence in
MICRA and arbitration in medical malpractice cases: "MICRA legislation was
based on an assumption that there were advantages to arbitration that would more
than offset the potential lack of direct informed consent, including expedited
resolution of claims, reduced costs, sophisticated decision making, and removal
of disputes from the adversarial atmosphere of the courtroom.,
277
In fact, health courts would essentially be a mandatory and more regulated
version of arbitration with far fewer arbitrators; in other words, they would have
the drawbacks of MICRA without the benefits. Unlike Kaiser's contracts and the
workers' compensation model (in which the "trade-off of loss of a right to bring
an action in court that is counterbalanced by a 'guaranteed' award that is not fault
based"), 278 health courts absolutely deprive would-be litigants from their right to
pursue trial in the traditional system. Furthermore, without a large pool of
potential judges, the health court model presents a concentrated problem of
politicization, as both sides would lobby for the appointment or election of their
favored judges. Moreover, the additional implementation of a rate schedule for
injury-specific noneconomic damages would further limit the judges' ability to
award appropriate damages. 279 Because health courts will not reduce the net
273. Id. The American Arbitration Association states that it "provides services to individuals
and organizations who wish to resolve conflicts out of court." Am. Arbitration Ass'n, About Us,
http://www.adr.org/About (last visited May 3, 2007).
274. David Zukher, Comment, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Medical Malpractice
Disputes: Will a Well-Drafted Arbitration Agreement Help the Medicine Go Down?, 49 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 135, 141 (1998).
275. Studdert & Brennan, supra note 271, at 236.
276. See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) (remanding for
consideration of the lower court to consider whether an arbitration agreement should be
unenforceable because evidence supported fraud and bad-faith delay on the part of Kaiser);
Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976) (holding that Kaiser's medical
services contract was not adhesive); Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963)
(holding that Kaiser's contract was unenforceable because the patient was not in a position to reject
the agreement).
277. Studdert & Brennan, supra note 271, at 237-38.
278. ABA Network, supra note 121.
279. Common Good, supra note 6.
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transactional cost or expedite the resolution of claims, the health court model
fails to satisfy all of the California Supreme Court's justifications for upholding
Kaiser's arbitration clause under MICRA. Without certain improvement of the
malpractice problem, the idea of subjecting one state's residents to mandatory
adjudication similar to arbitration without consent does not appear to be
equitable.
B. The Net Transactional Cost of Health Courts and Wisconsin's Medical
Mediation Panels
280
Created in 1986 by the state legislature, Wisconsin's medical mediation
panels provide "an informal, inexpensive and expedient means for resolving
[medical malpractice] disputes without litigation. 28' Claimants cannot
commence court action prior to filing a request for mediation unless proceedings
began within fifteen days before the filing and there have not been any discovery
or pretrial or trial conferences.282 The mediation panel consists of three
individuals (a layperson serving a two year term, a licensed Wisconsin attorney,
and a health care provider), each of whom receives $150 in compensation per day
of mediation.
283
As mediations are less formal proceedings, there are no records, physical
examinations, subpoenas, oaths, or expert witnesses; 284 however, the statutes
expressly permit the mediation panel to consult and reimburse any expert it feels
necessary.285 The panel's decision is not binding.286 Annual fees charged to
health care providers and to hospitals for each occupied bed fund the costs of the
mediation panel.287 The availability of mediation panels potentially reduces
litigation costs because the panel informally assesses the strength of the
plaintiffs claim and the physician's defense, which can lead to settlements or
dropped claims.
Based on available statistics from 1986 to 1994, it appears that adjudication
by the mediation panels keeps a significant number of cases from entering the
court system. 288 When cases entered mediation prior to the filing of a court
claim, nearly half either settled as a direct result of mediation or became inactive
after the statute of limitations had expired. 289 Like health courts, mediation
280. WIs. STAT. § 655,42(1) (2005).
281. Act of June 12, 1986, No. 340, § 69m, 85 Wis. ACT 1508 (1986).
282. WIS. STAT. § 655.44, .445.
283. Id. § 655.465.
284. Id. § 655.58.
285. Id. § 655.58(3)(b).
286. Wis. Court Sys., Medical Mediation Panels, http://www.wicourts.gov/about/organization/
offices/mmp.htm (last visited May 3, 2007).
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panels serve as a more affordable litigation alternative, thus inviting claims of
lesser damages.2 90 In fact, pro se litigants brought nearly 15% of the claims
presented to mediation panels. 29 1 Because the financial accessibility of the
mediation panels mirrors the broader courtroom access proposed by health
courts, studying the distribution of cases heard by mediation panels may help
demonstrate the potential increase of lesser claims under the health court model.
In mediation cases seeking damages less than $25,000, nearly half resulted
in no action after mediation and about a quarter settled at or shortly after the
mediation session. 292 Certainly, there are many variables in deciding to pursue
litigation, but it is likely that claimants dropped or settled those claims due to
questionable merit or the expected cost of trying the claim in court. Victims with
lesser claims may not be able to recover through mediation because a mediator's
determination is not binding, thus a plaintiffs damages still have to exceed
litigation costs before any compensation occurs.
Currently, the limited accessibility of litigation maintains a steady rate of
about fifteen court claims filed per one hundred doctors, with 30% of those
claims resulting in an insurance payment.293 If health courts replaced the current
litigation system, it is possible that a large portion of the 73% of the mediation
panel's cases under $25,000 that were not litigated would have been, as fewer
claimants would have settled out of court if binding litigation were more
feasible. 294 Furthermore, although the statistics are unclear as to how many cases
lacked merit, at least some of the cases would have been adjudicated in health
court because of the smaller perceived hurdle to potential compensation. With
90% of asserted claims dropped, dismissed, or settled before reaching trial,295 the
effect of lowering the litigation bar could better compensate victims with less
severe injuries; but the increase in litigated claims could also overwhelm the
health court docket, raise net transactional costs, and cause insurance companies
to hike up malpractice premiums.
C. The Efficiency of Health Courts and New Jersey's Special Mass Tort Courts
2 96
As home to many of the world's pharmaceutical companies, New Jersey has
opted to channel mass torts into specialized courts to ease the stress on the
290. See id.
291. Id.
292. Id. Twenty-four percent of the cases seeking less than $25,000 settled at or shortly after the
session "[a]s a direct result of mediation." Id. In 49% of the cases, however, there was neither a
settlement nor a filing in circuit court by the time the statute of limitations had expired. Id.
293. CoNG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 4.
294. Wis. Court Sys., supra note 286.
295. Romano, supra note 25, at 29.
296. See generally Editorial, Health Courts Are Worth a Try, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),
July 18, 2005; Press Release, N.J. Judiciary, Adoption of Rule 4:38A - "Centralized Management
of Mass Torts" (Oct. 23, 2003), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/n03l028a.htm.
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superior courts.29 7 Conceptually, the ability to centralize numerous substantively
similar claims makes the system significantly more efficient and the results more
consistent. In 2003, the New Jersey legislature established specialized courts to
handle certain types of mass tort cases, including those concerning Vioxx. 298 Any
judge or attorney involved with a potential mass tort case may apply to the New
Jersey Supreme Court for designation of the case as a mass tort. 299 If the state's
supreme court determines a case to be a mass tort, the Chief Justice will assign it
to one of four superior court judges designated to exclusively manage mass tort
cases under the civil section of the New Jersey Superior Court in three locations
across the state .300 All orders handed down in mass tort courts will be "published
in the legal newspapers, and will be posted in the Mass Tort Information Center
on the Judiciary's Internet website.
' 30 1
Like New Jersey's mass tort courts, the proposed health courts would filter
malpractice cases out of the traditional state circuits for adjudication by judges
exclusively hearing health care matters.30 2 Theoretically, the advantage of these
specialized courts is two-fold: promoting efficiency in the circuits and uniformity
of outcomes. Since New Jersey declared Vioxx-related injuries to be a mass tort
in June 2003,303 thousands of claims have been filed in New Jersey against
pharmaceutical giant Merck, which is headquartered in the state.304 Merck pulled
Vioxx from the shelves on September 30, 2004 following FDA reports that the
use of the drug may have resulted in 27,000 heart attacks and sudden cardiac
deaths.305 After the recall, the number of claims filed in New Jersey state courts
297. See N.J. Judiciary, supra note 296.
298. N.J. R. SUPER. CT., TAx CT., & SURR. CT. Civ. R. 4:38A (2005) (authorizing the New Jersey
Supreme Court to designate a case or category of cases as a mass tort for centralized adjudication).
Other New Jersey mass torts currently include Accutane, asbestos, Bextra/Celebrex, Ciba Geigy,
diet drugs, horomone-replacement therapy (HRT), Long Branch Manufactured Gas Plant
(LBMGP), lead paint, phenylpropoanolamine (PPA), and tobacco. Id.; see also Richard J. Williams,
Admin. Dir. of the Courts, Directive 11-03, Mass Torts-Guidelines and Criteria for Designation
(Oct. 27, 2003), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/directive/civil/dir 11 03.pdf (setting
forth the mass-tort guidelines).
299. Williams, supra note 298. New Jersey Directive 11-03 lists fourteen non-exclusive factors
considered in determining whether a case should be designated as a mass tort and provides "a
procedure for interested attorneys to have input into the process." Id
300. N.J. Judiciary, Mass Tort Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/
mass-tort/faq.htm (last visited May 3, 2007). Subsequent cases that fall within the established mass
tort categories transfer automatically to the appropriate mass tort judge. Williams, supra note 304.
301. Williams, supra note 298.
302. STRUVE, supra note 123, at 71.
303. N.J. Judiciary, Notice to the Bar, RE: Designation of Vioxx Litigation as a Mass Tort (June
6, 2007), available at, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/n0306l1 a.htm.
304. John Curran, Vioxx Cases Would Take Judge 583 Years To Hear, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, Dec. 26, 2005, at A7.
305. John Covaleski, Mass Tort Docket Grows in New Jersey as HRT, Vioxx Litigation Multiplies,
N.J. L.J., Oct. 15, 2004, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1097686249066.
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ballooned from 175 to 4333.306 The state supreme court centralized all of the
New Jersey Vioxx cases and assigned them to superior court Judge Carol
Higbee-a former malpractice attorney chosen for her familiarity with mass torts
and "largely because other vicinages handling mass torts have full caseloads.
30 7
In the end, if the 4333 Vioxx cases in New Jersey had not been centralized, they
would have clogged the dockets of the various superior courts, which in turn
could compound inefficiency with inconsistent holdings.
The efficiency of the judicial system as a whole, however, does not
necessarily include the efficiency of the specialized court. "If [New Jersey's
4,333 Vioxx cases] all go to trial and take as long as a recent, seven-week case,
Higbee would need 583 years to hear them all."3 8 At that rate, while the liability
portion of the trials might be efficient, the damage calculation for individual
victims could take years following the filing of a claim. Furthermore, a mass tort
in New Jersey is defined by an identification of certain common case
characteristics, 309 whereas medical malpractice claims are inherently fact-
intensive. Thorough adjudication of these facts would only add to the length of
trials and the amount of time victims of medical negligence would have to wait to
receive compensation. Common Good has asserted that "[p]atients injured by
mistakes should be compensated for their injuries without waiting years," 310 but
even assuming that the use of health courts would reduce the actual length of
each trial, specialized courts do not guarantee more timely compensation.
31
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Common Good's health court model falls short of its advocates'
expectations, and its potential benefits do not sufficiently outweigh its likely
costs for the United States to abandon using the traditional tort system for
medical malpractice claims. Admittedly, there are problems with the current
litigation scheme. Unlike the uncertainty that would come with implementing
health courts, however, the problems with malpractice litigation are predictable
306. Id.; Curran, supra note 304.
307. Covalenski, supra note 305.
308. Curran, supra note 304.
309. N.J. JUDICIARY, NEW JERSEY MASS TORT (NON-ASBESTOS) RESOURCE BOOK 1 (2005),
available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/masstortsopnonasbestos.pdf.
310. Common Good, supra note 6.
311. Consider the following statistics. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, there were
1061 paid medical malpractice claims in Pennsylvania in 2005. Kaiser Family Foundation, 50 State
Comparisons: Number of Paid Medical Malpractice Claims, 2005, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/
cgi-bin/healthfacts.cgi?action=compare&category=Providers+%26+Service+Use&subcategory=
Medical+Malpractice&topic=Paid+Medical+Malpractice+Claims (last visited May 3, 2007). If one
assumes a 27% plaintiff win rate, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 143, it can be
estimated that Pennsylvanians litigated 3930 claims in 2005. While this crude hypothetical does not
factor in the influx of lesser claims, see supra Section II.C, it suggests the inevitability of a clogged
health court docket.
39
Chow: Health Courts: An Extreme Makeover of Medical Malpractice with Po
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
and, to some extent, controllable, in that the rate of claims filed remains stagnant
from year to year.
Despite the apparent disconnect between litigation trends and malpractice
premiums, 313 there is evidence from over forty states with at least one statutory
restriction on malpractice awards in the current tort scheme that premiums are
lower with restrictions than without them. 314 Furthermore, a 2005 study on
physician supply found "greater growth in physician supply in states that adopted
reforms directly limiting liability than in states that did not. 3 15 Tort reformers
should not discount the relatively certain success that comes with reforming the
traditional litigation scheme.3 16 In contrast, the health court model limits
individual liability while expanding collective liability, and its adoption would
aggravate the impact of the next malpractice crisis. As such, tort reformers
should focus their efforts on modifying the current system instead of spending
federal dollars to experimentally implement an unproven new program.
In a 2003 report concluding that health courts were not the answer to
Pennsylvania's medical malpractice crisis, the Project on Medical Liability
"suggest[ed] that procedural reform should focus instead on supporting the
efforts of judges and juries to assess scientific and medical questions and on
providing guidance for the award and review of noneconomic damages. 31 7 To
prevent the dueling-experts phenomenon, the report proposed imposing
heightened standards for expert witnesses or encouraging judges to obtain expert
testimony from neutral sources (for example, using empirical data to establish
medical custom). 318 The report also mentioned methods for increasing
consistency among noneconomic damage awards-including proposed statutory
provisions that "would direct the judge to order remittitur if the judge determines
that the jury's award 'deviates materially from what would be reasonable
compensation"' and effectively lower the common "shocks the conscience"
standard. 319 Although researchers have not yet studied the effects of these more
modest reforms, their experimental implementation would cost substantially less
than a health court test run.
With the Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act sitting in committee
following June 2006 hearings, 320 the medical malpractice reform debate has
taken on new life. The potential for federal funding encourages states to tackle
the malpractice crisis by implementing litigation alternatives, including health
312. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 4.
313. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
314. Id
315. Kessler et al., supra note 220, at 2623.
316. See, e.g., id.; sources cited supra note 47.
317. See STRUVE, supra note 123, at 91.
318. Id at 83-84.
319. Id at 89.
320. Medical Liability: New Ideals for Making the System Work Better for Patients: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 109th Cong. (2006).
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courts. According to Howard, "We need.., to make a compelling case that, one,
the current system doesn't work very well, and two, [the health court model] has
a chance of working hopefully much better, and therefore we should try it
out."32' Still, America has experienced malpractice crises twice before, 322 and
Professor William Sage, a principal researcher for the Project on Medical
Liability, cautions that "[t]oday we have to think about all the aspects of this
problem before jumping to any solution."
323
The foremost concerns in this crisis are the cost of obtaining and providing
health care, the efficiency of dispute resolution, and the equity of judgments. The
proposal of health courts ambitiously attempts to solve all of those issues by
carving out malpractice claims from the traditional litigation system and creating
specialized tribunals of expert judges to hear them instead. By virtue of having
lesser venues and no juries, state health courts could theoretically set forth a more
consistent standard of care for physicians in less time with less cost.
Implementing these courts, however, could lead to inequitable judgments, drive
up transactional costs and malpractice premiums, and delay the resolution and
compensation of victims' claims.
Regardless of the variables that make up the malpractice crisis, when one
third of a state's surgeons leave in the span of eight years, 324 there is
unquestionably a need for reform, and that reform should improve upon, rather
than overhaul, the litigation system.325 Pending the passage of the Fair and
Reliable Medical Justice Act of 2005, states could soon be able to take advantage
of federally funded grants to explore malpractice litigation alternatives. Despite
having been touted as "a reliable system of medical justice" by its proponents,326
health courts provide a very limited solution while potentially aggravating the
current malpractice climate. Tort reformers should solve the problems of the
current system by modifying it, instead of instigating an extreme makeover with
uncertain and undesirable consequences.
321. Eliasberg, supra note 33.
322. Sage, supra note 11, at 469-70.
323. Romano, supra note 25, at 28.
324. Scalpel, Scissors, Lawyer, supra note 67.
325. In 2005, thirty-two states enacted medical malpractice legislation, ranging from expert-
witness qualifications to administrative procedures for the revocation of licenses from doctors who
are repeatedly found guilty of medical malpractice. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Medical
Malpractice Tort Reform: 2005 Enacted Legislation in the States, http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/
sclaw/medmalenacted2005.htm (last visited May 3, 2007). Researchers could study the
indoctrination of these varied state reforms to determine the optimal combination for resolving the
problems associated with the malpractice crisis.
326. Common Good, supra note 6.
41
Chow: Health Courts: An Extreme Makeover of Medical Malpractice with Po
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
42
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol7/iss2/4
